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Recent Decisions
ACT OF

STATE-HCKENLOOPER

AMENDMENT NOT AN EXPANSION

OF

THE "BERNSTEIN EXCEPTION"

Plaintiff, Banco Nacional de Cuba (hereinafter Banco),' brought
suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to
recover the excess realized on the sale of collateral that secured a one
year renegotiated loan2 for ten million dollars 3 made in 1960 by
defendant, First National City Bank of New York (hereinafter
Citibank). Shortly after the renegotiation, the Cuban Government
nationalized defendant's eleven Cuban branch offices. 4 Citibank sold
the collateral for an estimated twelve million dollars, and retained the
entire amount on the grounds that the excess over the amount of the
loan could be retained as partial compensation for the expropriated
properties. Ruling that the holding announced in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino' was, in effect, overruled by the Hickenlooper
amendment 6 and that the amendment was applicable, the district
1. Banco was the financial agent of the Cuban Government: "There is no
serious question that the Government of Cuba and Banco Nacional are one and
the same .... " Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York,
270 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. The original loan was made by First National City to Banco de Desarrollo
Economicoy Social (Bandes), a corporate agency of the government of the
Republic of Cuba, for fifteen million dollars. After the Castro Government seized
control of the Republic of Cuba, the loan was renewed for another year
commencing on July 8, 1959. Cuban Law No. 730, February 16, 1960 and Law
No. 847, June 30, 1960, dissolved Bandes and declared Banco successor to the
rights and obligations thereof, including the obligation to repay the loan. 270

F. Supp. at 1005.
3. When the loan was renegotiated on July 7, 1960, Banco repaid five million
dollars and Citibank released approximately one-third of the collateral. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394, 395
(2d Cir. 1970).
4. Executive Power Resolution No. 2, issued September 17, 1960, left no
doubt that the confiscations were permanent. Text reprinted in 270 F. Supp. at
1009 n.6.
5. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970): "(2) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
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court granted summary judgment for Citibank.7 On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' Citibank petitioned the

through such a state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles
of international law, including the principles of compensation and other standards
set out in this subsection: Provided,That this subparagraph shall not be applicable
(1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international
law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant
to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in
good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case
with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with
the court."
7. "The Sabbatino amendment is inapplicable 'in any case with respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.' 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). However, since the Executive Branch has maintained silence
for the six years that this action has been pending, it is clear that it has not
determined that foreign policy interests of the United States require application
of the act of state doctrine here." 270 F. Supp. at 1010 n.8. The nationalization
was determined to be in violation of international law. "The totality of
circumstances presented by this case-a patent failure to provide adequate
compensation, a retaliatory confiscation by a foreign government, and discrimination against the United States nationals-compel a finding that the Cuban decree
directing confiscation of First National City's property was in direct contravention
of the principles of international law." 270 F. Supp. 1010. Plaintiff did not
dispute Citibank's right to the ten million dollars derived from the sale: Banco
only contested the retention of the excess.
8. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). The court held that the Hickenlooper
amendment was not applicable in this instance, by indulging in a strained
interpretation of congressional intent. Professor Lillich suggests that the interpretation of the legislative history came from Banco's brief. Lillich, 1970 Survey
of New York Law: International Law, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 263, 269-80
(1971). The court added that failure to apply the act of state doctrine would run
counter to what Congress had intended to be the statutory method of recovery.
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1643 (1970). Pertinent sections of this act are set out below.
§ 1623(h): "The Commission shall notify all claimants of the approval or
denial of their claims, stating the reasons and grounds therefor, and, if approved,
shall notify such claimants of the amount for which such claims are approved.
Any claimant whose claim is denied.., shall be entitled, under such regulations as
the Commission may prescribe, to a hearing before the Commission, or its duly
authorized representatives, with respect to such claim ....
The action of the
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Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on October 13, 1970.2 On
November 17, 1970, the Legal Adviser to the State Department sent a
letter to the Supreme Court, expressing the opinion of the executive
branch that the act of state doctrine should not be applied in this

case.1" The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision of
Commission in allowing or denying any claim under this subchapter shall be final
and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not subject to review by the
Secretary of State or any official, department, agency, or establishment of the
United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise."
§ 1643: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide for the determination
of the amount and validity of claims against the Government of Cuba...
[arising] out of nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other takings of,
or special measures directed against, property of nationals of the United
States... arising out of violations of international law by the Government of
Cuba... in order to obtain information concerning the total amount of such
claims against the Government of Cuba. .. on behalf of nationals of the United
States. This subchapter shall not be construed as authorizing an appropriation or
as any intention to authorize an appropriation for the purpose of paying such
claims."
§ 1643(b)(a): "The Commission shall receive and determine in accordance with
applicable substantive law, including international law, the amount and validity of
claims by nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba...
arising since January 1, 1959, in the case of claims against the Government of
Cuba... for losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention,
or other taking of, or special measures directed against, property including any
rights or interests therein owned wholly or partially, directly or indirectly at the
time by nationals of the United States."
§ 1643(e): "In determining the amount of any claim, the Commission shall
deduct all amounts the claimant has received from any source on account of the
same loss or losses."
According to the court, it would seem that Congress wanted this type of claim
to be submitted to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. 431 F.2d at 403.
For a hypothetical example of the settlement of a claim through the Foreign

Claims Settlement Commission see 431 F.2d at 404 n.18.
9. Petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970) (No. 846).
10. Letter from John R. Stevenson to the clerk of the United States Supreme
Court, the Honorable E. Robert Seaver, Nov. 17, 1970. 442 F.2d at 536-38. The
letter stated in part: "Recent events, in our view, make appropriate a
determination by the Department of State that the act of state need not be
applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or setoff when (a)
the foreign state's claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing
when the act of state occurred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is
limited to the amount of the foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign policy
interests of the United States do not require application of the doctrine....
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine should not be
Vol. 5-No. 2
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the Second Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration." On remand, Citibank contended that the Second Circuit
should reverse its prior decision because the executive branch had
submitted a "Bernstein letter"' 2 which made application of the act of
state doctrine unnecessary. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
held, prior decision affirmed. 13 The exception to the act of state
doctrine created by the Bernstein case should be limited to its own

facts, and the State Department's letter of November 17, 1970 did not
remove the restraint of the act of state doctrine. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 530, cert,

granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Oct, 12, 1971).
In Underhill v. Hernandez,14 the Supreme Court first enunciated
the act of state doctrine. The Court said that "[e] very sovereign State
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory."'" The first
direct executive intervention in the application of the act of state
doctrine occurred in an attempt to recover property seized by the
Nazi Government. 1 6 Judge Learned Hand, in Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme,' applied the act of state doctrine
applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or setoff against the
Government of Cuba in this or like cases."
11. The Solicitor General suggested to the Supreme Court that it remand the
case to the court of appeals for the court's further consideration in light of the
State Department's views. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). In remanding the case, the Supreme Court noted
that it was "expressing no views on the merits of the case." 400 U.S. at 1019.
12. For an explanation of the Bernstein letter, see Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaanche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954) (per curiam).
13. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
14. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The earliest pronouncement of this doctrine was in
Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876). See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 64-138
(1964). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § §41-43 (1965).
15. 168 U.S. at 252. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1917),
the Court said: "The principle that the conduct of one independent government

cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another.., rests at last upon
the highest considerations of international comity and expediency." 246 U.S. at
303.
16. See Cheatham & Maier, Private InternationalLaw and Its Sources, 22
L. REV. 27, 90 (1968).

VAND.

17. 163 F.2d 246 (2d. Cir. 1947).
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and refused to consider the validity of the Nazi confiscation." s In a
subsequent case 9 involving the same seizure, however, the court
reached the validity of the acts of the Nazi officials and held that the
State Department's letter to the court had expressly released it from
the restraint of the act of state doctrine, 20 thus giving birth to the
so-called "Bernstein exception." Squarely facing the problem of the
application of the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine applied and,
therefore, that United States courts were prevented from examining
the validity of the acts of the Cuban Government "in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles ... ."21 The Court avoided passing upon the validity of the
"Bernstein exception" since all doubt of executive policy was
removed by the amicus briefs of the executive branch in favor of
applying the act of state doctrine.2 2 Subsequently, Congress passed
18. The court reaffirmed its decision in the first Bernstein case, holding that
the act of state doctrine prevented judicial determination of the confiscatory acts
of the Nazi Government because of the lack of definite expression of executive
policy. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d. Cir. 1949).
19. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Americaansche Stoomvaart-Maatshcappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
.20. "3. The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the
United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu
thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in
Germany, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of
their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to Bennett, House & Couts, April 13,
1949, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable PropertyInvolved in

Nazi Forced Transfers, 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592, 593 (May 8, 1949).
21. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court reasoned: "[The act of state, doctrine]
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system

of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international

relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense
of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international

sphere." 376 U.S. at 423.
22. "[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine

the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign

government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of the
suit ... even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law." 376 U.S. at 428.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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the Hickenlooper amendment.23 The effect of the amendment was a
reversal of presumptions. Under the Sabbatino decision, courts assume
that any adjudication on the merits of the act of the foreign state
would embarrass the executive in the conduct of foreign policy unless
the executive expresses a contrary view. Under the amendment, the
courts assume that they may proceed with an adjudication of the
validity of the foreign act, unless the President expresses the view that
24
such an adjudication would impede the conduct of foreign policy.
Nevertheless, there was a difference of opinion among the proponents
of the legislation on the scope of the amendment.2" On remand of
23. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The amendment was re-enacted on Sept.
6, 1965, and contained a slight variation from the first Hickenlooper amendment.
The only change was the substitution of "other right to property" for "other
right" in two instances, and the deletion of Proviso 3, which had made the
amendment inapplicable to any proceeding commenced prior to January 1, 1966.
"The words 'to property' have been inserted to make it clear that the law does
not prevent banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions from
using the act of state doctrine as a defense to multiple liability upon any contract
or deposit or insurance policy in any case where such liability has been taken over
or expropriated by a foreign state." S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1965). For a discussion of the changes in the amended version of the
Hickenlooper amendment, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166,
171-72 (2d. Cir. 1967).
24. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
25. One author of the amendment took a broad view of its scope: "... its

[the amendment's] purpose is not merely to facilitate the occasional recovery of
specific goods or their money equivalent, but rather to restore and confirm a
model in principle and procedure.. . ." Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of
1965 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1035

(1965) (hereinafter cited as Hearings). Before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Attorney General Katzenbach expressed a more limited view: "We are
talking about a very isolated, infrequent occurrence which is when American
property that has been nationalized in some way or another finds its way back
into the United States." Id. at 1235. Senator Hickenlooper himself made
contradictory statements regarding the purpose of the amendment. Compare 110
CONG. REc. 19546 (1964) (letter of Senator Hickenlooper to the Washington
Post, July 27, 1964) and id. at 24076 with id. at 19548. In a letter from Professor
Cecil J. Olmstead to Donald M. Fraser, March 29, 1965, Mr. Olmstead posed a
hypothetical, qualifying his remarks made at the hearings. "Thus, if Castro sues a
U.S. bank whose branch he has seized in Havana for return of certain Cuban
Government accounts or collateral held by the U.S. bank, the present U.S. rule
(established in the Supreme Court decision in National City Bank v. Republic of

China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955)) is that by bringing suit Castro has waived sovereign
immunity and that the U.S. bank is permitted to make a counterclaim or setoff
for the value of its seized Havana branch." Hearings,supra note 25, at 1306.
Spring, 1972
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Sabbatino, the Second Circuit, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,2 6
upheld the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper amendment and
applied it.
to the case.2 7 The court reached the merits of the claim by
Banco and reasoned that since the Cuban law in question was in
violation of international law, judgment should be rendered for
plaintiff. Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the executive
branch had not suggested application of the act of state doctrine, it
should not be applied to the case. 28
The court in the instant case first determined that the State
Department's letter of November 17 expressed the view that the act of
state doctrine 9 should not be applied to bar consideration of the
merits. After an examination of the Bernstein case, the court

concluded that the "Bernstein exception" should be limited to its own

facts."0 The court reasoned that the circumstances leading to the
State Department's letter in the Bernstein case were unique. At the
26. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956, rehearing
denied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968). Farr Whitlock received notice on August 23, 1960
that Peter L.F. Sabbatino on August 16 had been appointed temporary receiver
for the assets pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 977-b (1963). Sabbatino was
eliminated when the parties agreed that the Lehman Brothers would hold a sum of
money in escrow to satisfy the final judgment in this case and Sabbatino
transferred $225,000 to Lehman Brothers for that purpose. 383 F.2d at 170-71.
27. "[W]e hold that the application of the Hickenlooper amendment to this
case does not deprive appellant [Banco] of its property without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment." 383 F.2d at 179. "Thus we find that the
adoption of the Hickenlooper Amendment was not legislative interference with
judicial power violative of the Federal Constitution; to the contrary, we find good

reason for judicial acceptance of this legislative modification of the act of state
doctrine." 383 F.2d at 182. The court also rejected the idea that Congress had
interfered with the executive power. 383 F.2d at 182. "The existing law [the

Hickenlooper amendment] applies to cases pending at the time of its enactment ...." S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
28. The district court had waited 60 days before entering final judgment to

allow the President to exercise his right under the amendment; the court was
informed by a letter from the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York on September 25, 1965, that the executive branch had made no
determination that the act of state doctrine should be applied. 383 F.2d at 172
n.7.
29. 210 F.2d at 375.
30. The court distinguished the Bernstein case on several points. First, in
Bernstein, the acts of state were performed by the German Government with
which the United States currently was at war, and the German Government was
no longer in existence when the letter was sent. In the instant case, the United

States has never been at war with the Castro Government and, furthermore,
recognized that government. Secondly, the "Nazi Government's actions had been
Vol. 5-No. 2
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time of the Bernstein decision the Nazi Government no longer existed,
and a duty to pay reparations had already been imposed; consequently, a suspension of the act of state doctrine would not affect the
negotiation of a reparations settlement.'
Since the court found that
the State Department's letter did not bring the instant case within the
narrow "Bernstein exception," it concluded that the act of state
doctrine barred examination of the validity of the expropriation by
the Cuban Government. Justice Hays, dissenting, argued that the
"Bernstein exception" was applicable to the instant case. He criticized
the majority's reasons for distinguishing Bernstein32 and argued that
the court was bound by Bernstein unless it decided to overrule it. The
dissent concluded that the determination of whether the court would
be barred by the act of state was not a judicial function, and should be
left to the executive and legislative branches. 3 Hays reasoned that
the majority had violated the fundamental purpose of the "Bernstein
exception" and had engaged in precisely the kind of judgment that the

exception sought to avoid.34
Pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, 35 Cuban assets are
not allowed to leave the United States. Once the value of such blocked
assets has been determined, this amount is submitted to the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission. 3 6 Consequently, if the judgment for
condemned throughout the world as crimes against humanity," and the Cuban
action had not been similarly condemned. Thirdly, the State Department's letter
in the Bernstein case indicated that it was United States policy to provide
restitution for all victims of Nazi confiscation, but in this case the concern was
only with those who asserted counterclaims or setoffs. Fourthly, defendant is
"seeking a windfall at the expense of other creditors," while in Bernstein, plaintiff
was seeking restitution for his property. And finally, the court reiterated a
distinction made in the Sabbatino case that the Nazi Government was no longer in
existence. 442 F.2d at 538.39. See also 431 F.2d at 404 n.18.
31. 442 F. 2d at 534.
32. "Considerations such as the acts of the Nazi government, the fact that we
were at war with the government in question, and the fact that that government no
longer existed, all used by the majority to distinguish Bernstein, were set forth not
by the court but by the State Department in its letter." 442 F.2d at 538
(dissenting opinion).
33. "The attitude of the United States toward foreign powers must be left, as
in Bernstein, to the decision of the other branches of government." 442 F. 2d at
538.
34. 442 F. 2d at 538.
35. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 (1970).
36. 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (1970); see generally R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS
(1962).
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Banco stands, the excess from the sale of the collateral will be turned
over to the Commission. The court's decision appears to be based
upon two political considerations: this fund might be used either to
satisfy at a later time the claims against the Cuban Government on a percentage basis3 7 or as leverage to help The United States in negotiations
with Cuba as long as the title to the money in this fund rests in the Cuban
Government. Whether the court of appeals in this instance applied the
act of state doctrine based upon these political considerations, thus
encroaching upon the powers left to the executive branch, or
adjudicated the case strictly on the merits, is unclear.3" If the
executive resolved these political questions in its letter, it would
appear to be error for the court to decline to adjudicate the
counterclaim on its merits. 9 Because of the court's first opinion,
which had held the Hickenlooper amendment inapplicable, the State
Department was forced to write a letter addressing itself to the fact
that the court had held that the act of state doctrine barred Citibank's
counterclaim, despite the State Department's position that the
doctrine should not be applied; thus, the Department was attempting
to include the letter in the "Bernstein exception." 4
Since the State
Department did not say that application of the act of state doctrine
was vital to foreign policy interests, the executive branch must not
have been concerned with whether the recovery was to be turned over
to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Both decisions of the
Second Circuit avoided reaching the merits of Citibank's counterclaim.
In the first opinion the court held that the Hickenlooper amendment
did not apply.4 1 The second opinion held that the case did not come
within the "Bernstein exception." 42 These decisions have created two
distinct classes of cases, one coming under the Hickenlooper amendment, and the other limited to the property seized by the Nazi

Government controlled by the "Bernstein exception." In effect, the
Second Circuit has eliminated the "Bernstein exception" by interpreting it so narrowly. The distinction between the two is that under

37. See hypothetical example note 12, supra.
38. When the court first decided this case, it examined in detail the method in
which the recovery would be added to the existing fund and the fact that Citibank
could then join with the other American nationals who had property confiscated
by Cuba in claiming compensation from the fund. 431 F. 2d at 394.
39. See Petitioner's Brief for certiorari at 11.
40. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Americaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
41. 431 F. 2d at 394.
42. 442 F. 2d at 530.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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the "exception" the court applies the act of state doctrine absent a
communication from the executive branch that it desires an adjudication of the case, but under the amendment, the court does not

apply the doctrine unless the executive expresses the view that an
adjudication would hinder United States foreign policy interests. In
this instance the State Department did not expect an expression of
executive policy to be necessary because of the Hickenlooper
amendment. The letter did not become necessary until after theSecond Circuit had ruled that the Hickenlooper amendment was
inapplicable.4 3 It appears that Congress was trying to supplement the
coverage of the "Bernstein exception" by passing the Hickenlooper
amendment. Because of the attitudes taken by the executive branch in
its letter of November 17 and the legislative branch in the Hickenlooper amendment, it would be better judicial policy for the court to
reach the merits of Citibank's counterclaim, thereby synthesizing the
Hickenlooper amendment and the "Bernstein exception" rather than
treating the two as completely separate." Such an approach would
implement the intent of both the executive and legislative branches
and would clarify a body of previously confused law.
Randolph B. Jones

43. Letter, supra note 10.
44. If the court cannot correlate the expressions of legislative and executive
policies, it should recognize a "fair play" exception similar to that expressed in
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). See
Note, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 406, 418 (1971). In the Republic of China case, the
court held that it would be unfair for a foreign sovereign, suing in the courts of
the United States, to raise the defense of sovereign immunity to bar a
counterclaim. The Republic of China would be liable on contract claims in its
own courts, and Americans have the same rights as Chinese in those courts. 348
U.S. 356. See generally R. FALK. supra note 14, 139-69; see also Petitioner's
Brief for certiorari, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.
Spring, 1972
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ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-SHIPOWNERS' DUTY OF SEAWORTHINESS
DOES NOT EXTEND TO LONGSHOREMAN INJURED ON THE DOCK BY AN
INSTRUMENT NOT APPURTENANT TO VESSEL

Respondent, a forklift operator, was injured by the overhead
protection rack of his forklift' while stage-loading2 cargo destined for
a vessel owned by petitioner.' The forklift was owned and controlled
by respondent's stevedore employer. Respondent brought an action
against the ship and shipowner under the diversity4 and admiralty'
jurisdiction of the federal district court. Respondent alleged that
petitioner breached his duty of seaworthiness or, alternatively, his
duty of due care. Petitioner filed a third-party indemnification claim
against the stevedore company. 6 On cross motions for summary
judgment on the seaworthiness claim, 7 the district court held for
petitioner. The district court found that respondent was not loading
the vessel and held that the shipowner owed no duty of seaworthiness

to him. The Court of Appeals reversed,' found that respondent was
engaged in loading the vessel and held that he should be entitled to
prove his allegations of unseaworthiness? On writ of certiorari, the

1. The protection rack is a metal frame positioned above the driver's seat to
protect him from falling objects. In this case, the overhead protection rack of the
forklift came loose and fell on respondent, causing the injuries of which he
complained. Respondent's investigation after the accident allegedly revealed that

the four bolts which should have secured the rack were missing.
2. Respondent's forklift had picked up a large load of cargo on the dock and
was transferring it to a point alongside the vessel where it subsequently was to be
hoisted aboard by the ship's own gear.
3. The vessel was the S.S. Sagamore Hill, a ship owned and operated by
Victory Carriers, Inc., which was loading cargo in Mobile, Alabama. Respondent's
employer, Gulf Stevedore Corp., was in charge of the loading operation.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
6. A shipowner held liable to a longshoreman for unseaworthiness may bring a
third-party action against the stevedore company for indemnity if the longshoreman's injury was occasioned by a breach of the stevedore's warranty to the

shipowner of workmanlike performance. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
7. The district court and the court of appeals dealt only with the
unseaworthiness claim; the district court did not pass on the question of whether
or not the forklift was in fact defective. Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d
376, 378 n.2 (5th Cir. 1970).
8. 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970).
9. 432 F.2d at 385. The court relied on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85 (1946) and Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). For a
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Supreme Court, held, reversed. The duty of seaworthiness does not
extend to a longshoreman injured on the dock by a defective forklift
owned and controlled by his employer. Victory Carriers,Inc. v. Law,
404 U.S. 202 (1971).
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts includes "all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." 10 While federal
maritime jurisdiction over contracts is dependent on a subject matter
conceptualization of the pendant contract, 11 federal maritime tort
jurisdiction is dependent on a spatial conceptualization of the location
of the tort. 12 Historically, only those torts consummated on the

discussion of these decisions see notes 22, 25, 26, & 28 and accompanying text,
infra.
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress has implemented this provision,
giving the district courts "original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of ...[a] ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases, all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). Under the saving to suitors clause, the respondent in the
instant case was entitled to assert his claims under the diversity jurisdiction of the
district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), as well as under § 1333 itself. Cf. Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1953). Under either section,
however, the claim that a ship or its gear was unseaworthy would be rooted in
federal maritime law and not state law. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S.
202, 204 (1971).
11. In the leading early case of De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815), Justice Story held that the federal maritime jurisdiction
"extends over all contracts (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or
whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations) which relate to the navigation,
business or commerce of the sea." 7 F. Cas. at 444. See generally G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 18-28 (1957).
12. The spatial conceptualization of the location of the tort, upon which
federal maritime tort jurisdiction depends, is often referred to as the "locality"
test. The locality test is described by Justice Story as follows: "In regard to torts I
have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively
dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has not, and never (I
believe) deliberately claimed to have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are
maritime torts, that is, such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters
within the ebb and flow of the tide." Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No.
13,902)(C.C.D. Me. 1813). Accord, Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S.
212, 214-15 (1969); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953);
Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1914); Martin v. West, 222
U.S. 191, 197 (1911); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 33 (1865); The
Commerce, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 574, 579 (1861); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
441, 463-64 (1847); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 420 (No. 3,776)(C.C.D.
Mass. 1815).
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navigable waters were within maritime tort jurisdiction. 13 Piers and
docks were early characterized as extensions of the land and not as
"navigable water," 14 and the dividing line was held to be the
gangplank. 1" Although the relative roles of state and federal maritime
law subsequently became confused on the seaward side of the pier, 16

13. Federal maritime tort jurisdiction embraces "every species of tort,
however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or
navigable waters.... ." Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 60 (1914).
Historically, torts consummated on land were clearly not within the federal
maritime jurisdiction. Rodrique v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360
(1969); T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); The Troy, 208 U.S. 321
(1908); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d
910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965). But cf. The Raithmoor,
241 U.S. 166 (1916); The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904). In The Blackheath, a
vessel had collided with a lighthouse, causing damage; in both cases, because the
structure damaged by the vessel was a structure principally concerned with
navigation, maritime tort jurisdiction was upheld, in spite of the fact that the
structures were technically extensions of the land. However, it is no longer
necessary to worry with the fine distinctions suggested by these cases. See note
19 and accompanying text, infra.
14. Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316,
320 (1908); Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 397 (1886);
Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1886); The Plymouth, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865). In defense of this dividing line and of the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal maritime law, the Supreme Court twice rejected congressional efforts to apply state workmen's compensation statutes to shipboard
injuries suffered by maritime workers and longshoremen. See Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S.
149 (1920). These congressional attempts were sparked by an earlier Supreme
Court decision, Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), which had held
unconstitutional a New York state workmen's compensation law as applied to a
stevedore injured on the gangplank of a ship.
Accepting these decisions, Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 901-50 (1970), providing a system of
compensation for longshoremen injured on navigable waters. The Act's coverage
was limited, however, to those injuries and deaths "occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including any dry dock)." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)
(1970). The Court has interpreted Congress' intent as having anticipated that
dockside accidents would remain under the umbrella of state law and state
workmen's compensation systems. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212, 217-19 (1969); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S.
251, 256-57 (1940).
15. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865).

16. This confusion may be traced to the Court's modifying the doctrine of
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), by preserving certain state
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shoreward, the line had held fast. The Supreme Court refused to
permit recovery in admiralty when the locus 11 of the tort was on
"land" even where a ship or its gear, through collision or otherwise,
caused damage to persons ashore or to bridges, docks or other

shore-based property.

1"

Dissatisfied with the results of these de-

cisions, Congress passed the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. " The
Act provided that "[t] he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury,
to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated

remedies for accidents and deaths occurring on navigable waters. See Calbeck v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962); Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus.,
317 U.S. 249 (1942); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941);
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v.Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). All of these cases of overlapping state-federal
jurisdiction involved injuries on the seaward side of the Jensen line. The Court
upheld the power of the states to provide workmen's compensation to
longshoremen injured by accidents occurring on the dock, under the theory that
since the pier is part of the land, application of state law here would not conflict
with the uniform federal maritime law applied on navigable waters. See State
Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969), the Court held
that by limiting coverage under § 903 of the Act to accidents occurring "upon
navigable waters," Congress had not intended to cover accidents which occurred
on piers permanently affixed to the shore: "Calbeck made it clear that Congress
intended to exercise its full jurisdiction seaward of the Jensen line and to cover all
injuries on navigable waters, whether or not state compensation was also available
in particular situations.... But removing uncertainties as to the Act's coverage of
injuries occurring on navigable waters is a far cry from construing the Act to reach
injuries on land traditionally within the ambit of state compensation acts." 396
U.S. at 220-21.
17. Traditionally, the locus of a tort is the place of injury.
18. Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911); The Troy, 208 U.S. 321 (1908);
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908); The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). But cf. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S.
649 (1935).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The House Report on the Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act stated that the Act was being passed to remedy the
"inequities" of such cases as Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911); The Troy, 208
U.S. 321 (1908); and Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co.,
208 U.S. 316 (1908); which had held there was no admiralty jurisdiction to

provide a remedy for damage done by ships on navigable waters to land structures.
H.R. REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), at 2. Congress also passed the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), providing a statutory remedy for members of
a ship's crew injured in the course of their employment. The Act covered
Spring, 1972

RECENT DECISIONS

on land." 20 The statute survived constitutional attack in the lower
federal courts 2 and was applied without question by the Supreme
Court in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp. 22 In Gutierrez, the
Court permitted recovery on a seaworthiness claim against the
shipowner by a longshoreman injured on a dock by defective cargo
containers owned by a stevedore company. The containers had been
unloaded from a ship located on navigable waters. The doctrine of
unseaworthiness, under which the longshoreman in Gutierrez recovered, originated in The Osceola2 3 and has since experienced unremitting growth and expansion?4 In 1946 the Supreme Court held that the
obligation of seaworthiness, traditionally owed by an owner of a ship
to seamen, extended to longshoremen injured while doing the ship's
work aboard the ship even though they were employed by an
independent stevedoring contractor that the owner had hired to load
or unload the ship. 25 The Court's rationale for extending the duty of
seaworthiness to longshoremen injured on board a vessel was that a
worker "doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards,"

crewmen injured ashore as Well as aboard and was considered by the Supreme
Court to be an extension of the ancient remedy of maintenance and cure which
itself was a traditional and important exception to the usual rule that maritime
law does not provide remedies for injuries on land. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). Longshoremen, of course, are not
covered by the Jones Act.
20. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).

21. See United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 614-16 (9th
Cir. 1953); Fematt v. City of Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 89, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
American Bridge Co. v. The Gloria 0, 98 F. Supp. 71, 73-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
22. 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
23. 189 U.S. 158 (1903)- The second of Justice Brown's four propositions in
his opinion for the Court was the following: "That the vessel and her owner are,
both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply
and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." 189 U.S. at
175. Subsequently, the doctrine of unseaworthiness was severed from concepts of
negligence in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
24. In the words of Judge Coleman, "The doctrine is a growing concept,
constantly undergoing redefinition as the risks of those protected are enlarged by
changing technology and shipboard technique." Dillon v. M.S. Oriental Inventor,
426 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 248-394 (1957); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness,
and the Rights of HarborWorkers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954). See also Note,
The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 819 (1963).

25. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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should be entitled to the seaman's protections "regardless of the fact
that he is employed immediately by another than the owner." 2 6
Subsequently, the Court established that the shipowner's duty of
seaworthiness attaches to equipment supplied by the stevedore
company. 27 In Gutierrez, the Court further extended the applicability
of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to longshoremen by applying it to
an injury sustained by a longshoreman off the vessel and on the
dock. 28 The rationale implicit in the Gutierrez opinion was a logical
extension of the principle embodied in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki. 29 Since a longshoreman loading or unloading a vessel is
doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards, he
should be entitled to the seaman's protections regardless of the fact
that he is a few feet landward of the waterline. Post-Gutierrez
decisions turned, therefore, on a judicial determination of whether the
injured longshoreman was engaged in the process of "loading" or
"unloading" the vessel. 30 The minority defined "loading" and
"unloading" narrowly and mechanically. The cases limited "loading"
to those activities which began with the physical act of lifting the

26. 328 U.S. at 99. The Court further noted: "Historically the work of
loading and unloading is the work of the ship's service, performed until recent
times by members of the crew .... That the owner seeks to have it done with the
advantages of more modern divisions of labor does not minimize the worker's
hazard and should not nullify his protection." 328 U.S. at 96. Accordingly, the
Court concluded: "[w] hen a man is performing a function essential to maritime
service on board a ship the fortuitous circumstances of his employment by the
shipowner or a stevedoring contractor should not determine the measure of his
rights." 328 U.S. at 97.
27. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954), rev'g per curiam 205
F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1953); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). See
also Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315 (1964).
28. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). The injured
longshoreman in Gutierrez slipped on the dock on beans which had spilled out of
defective bags during the unloading of a cargo of beans from the vessel. On the
facts the Court concluded that the longshoreman was within the scope of the
shipowner's duty of seaworthiness, holding that "[t]he duty to provide a
seaworthy ship and gear, including cargo containers, applies to longshoremen
unloading the ship whether they are standing aboard ship or on the pier." 373
U.S. at 215 (emphasis added).
29. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
30. For a discussion of the theory behind the extension of shipowners' duty
of seaworthiness to longshoremen engaged in "loading" and "unloading," see note
26 and accompanying text, supra; cases cited notes 31 & 32, infra. See generally
Note, Risk Distributionand Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966).
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cargo onto the vessel and "unloading" to those activities which ended

with the physical act of lowering the cargo to the dock. "' The
majority defined "loading" and "unloading" in a more pragmatic and
less ritualistic sense. 32 While the applicability of the doctrine of
unseaworthiness had not been precisely delimited, the doctrine had
been extended to longshoremen injured on the dock. 3 3 Finally, the
doctrine had been expanded beyond equipment which was part of the
traditional gear of a ship or equipment which was attached to or
touching the ship. 11
In the instant case, the Court noted that Sieracki did not call into
question the extent of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction

31. See, eg., Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966). The
Drumgold opinion disposed of two separate actions, one by a longshoreman who
contended that he had been injured while loading a vessel, the other by a
longshoreman who contended that he had been injured while unloading a vessel.
Fearful of the possible logical extensions from an interpretation of "loading" and
"unloading" that was not limited to the actual physical act of loading or
unloading the vessel, the court applied the narrow definition and rejected the
plaintiffs' claims. 260 F. Supp. at 984-85, 986-87. See also Daniel v. Skibs A/S
Hilda Knudsen, 253 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir.
1966).
32. See, e.g., Byrd v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp.
1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969). As in the instant case, Byrd involved an injury to a
longshoreman engaged in moving cargo by means of a forklift machine from one
point on the dock to another point nearer the vessel. Finding that the plaintiff
longshoreman's actions at the time of the accident were direct, necessary steps in
the physical transfer of the cargo from the railroad car to the vessel, the court
refused to limit the concept of "loading" to the actual physical transfer of the
cargo from the dock to the ship, and held that plaintiff was essentially engaged in

a loading operation and was using equipment necessary for that purpose. See also
Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970); Thompson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913
(1964); Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963);
Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Cf.
Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432
F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), reversed the decision of the District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama which had applied the narrow definition of
"loading" and aligned itself with those cases applying the more expansive
definition. 432 F.2d at 384-85.
33. See note 28 and accompanying text, supra. See also cases cited note 31,
supra.

34. See Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966).
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since the accident there occurred on navigable waters, " and that in
Gutierrez federal admiralty jurisdiction was clearly present since the
Admiralty Extension Act "on its face" reached the injury there
involved. 36 The instant Court reasoned that the decision in Gutierrez
turned not upon the "function" the stevedore was performing-i.e.
whether or not he was engaged in loading or unloading at the time of
the injury. Rather, Gutierrez held that the injury was caused by an
appurtenance of a ship, the defective cargo containers. Therefore, the
injury was an "injury, to person ...

caused by a vessel on navigable

waters" within the meaning of the Admiralty Extension Act.3"
Applying this rationale, the Court held that respondent's injury was
not within the scope of the Act. 11 In reaching its decision, the Court
emphasized that affording respondent a maritime cause of action
would raise difficult questions concerning the extent to which state
law would be displaced or pre-empted. Further, maritime recovery would
circumvent state workmen's compensation statutes " and raise problems as to standards for and limitations of the applicability of
maritime law to accidents on land. 4 While the Court recognized that
the hazards of the longshoreman's occupation make him especially
deserving of a remedy dispensing with proof of fault,4 1 it noted that
the longshoreman already has a remedy under state workmen's
compensation laws that does not depend on proof of negligence on
the part of the employer. 42 The Court was of the opinion that if such
laws provide inadequate benefits, it is a problem more appropriate for
legislative rather than judicial consideration. 4 3 Finally, the Court
noted that the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness Would merely

35. 404 U.S. at 210.
36. 404 U.S. at 210.
37. 404 U.S. at 210.
38. 404 U.S. at 212-14.
39. 404 U.S. at 215-16.
40. The Court noted the split in the lower courts' attempts to define the
concept of "loading" for purposes of determining whether a longshoreman injured
on shore can recover on an unseaworthiness claim. See cases cited notes 31 & 32,
supra. The Court said that reliance upon the gangplank as the presumptive
boundary of admiralty jurisdiction, except for cases in which a ship's appurtenance causes damage ashore, recognizes the traditional limitations of admiralty
jurisdiction, see notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text, supra, and decreases the

arbitrariness and uncertainties surrounding amorphous definitions of "loading."
404 U.S. at 214 n.14.
41. See note 45, infra.
42. 404 U.S. at 215.

43. 404 U.S. at 215-16.
Spring, 1972

RECENT DECISIONS

be shifted to the stevedore company by way of a third-party action
for indemnity. "4

The Court's decisions prior to the instant case have consistently
reflected the principle that because the loading and unloading of
vessels is abnormally dangerous 45 such risks ought to be placed
initially upon the shipowners and ultimately passed on through higher
prices to the customers of the shipping industry. 46 In distinguishing
44. 404 U.S. at 215-16. See also Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
45. Stevedoring is one of the most hazardous professions in American
industry. According to the National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council, Maritime Cargo Transportation Conference Longshore Safety Survey
Report 22-23 (1956), hazardous industries have the following accident frequency
rates:
Stevedoring
Logging
Structural Steel Erection
Saw and Planing Mills
General Building

92.3
74.3
47.5
42.0
37.0

per million
per million
per million
per million
per million

man
man
man
man
man

hours
hours
hours
hours
hours

worked.
worked.
worked.
worked.
worked.

See also U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics 345 (1971); New York Shipping Ass'n, Safety Bureau, Annual Accident (1965). Cf. Note, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J.
1174 (1966).
46. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272
U.S. 50 (1926); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
In Sieracki, which held that longshoremen as well as seamen were entitled to
recover under the doctrine of unseaworthiness for injuries sustained aboard ship,
this principle was explained: "That the liability may not be either so founded or
so limited would seem indicated by the stress the cases uniformly place upon its
relation, both in character and in scope, to the hazards of marine service which
unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it. These, together with their
helplessness to ward off such perils and the harshness of forcing them to shoulder

alone the resulting personal disability and loss, have been thought to justify and to
require putting their burden. . . upon the [ship] owner regardless of his fault.
Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may result from
negligence. And beyond this he is in position, as the worker is not, to distribute
the loss in the shipping community which receives the service and should bear its
cost... .'" 328 U.S. at 93-94. "Historically the work of loading and unloading is
the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times by members of the
crew. [citations omitted]. That the owner seeks to have it done with the
advantages of more modern divisions of labor does not minimize the worker's
hazard and should not nullify his protection. .. ." 328 U.S. at 96.
Although some subsequent holdings sustaining the applicability of the doctrine
of seaworthiness might alternatively have been grounded in more mechanical
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Sieracki and Gutierrez the instant decision embraced a very narrow
interpretation of the duty of seaworthiness, the effect of which is to
abrogate the functional test4 7 which has been used consistently since

rules, the language of even these cases have reflected this broad principle. For
example, in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), which held that a
longshoreman was not deprived by the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Act,
33 U.S.C. § § 901-50 (1970), of his unseaworthiness remedy merely because the
shipowner happened also to be his stevedore employer, the Court relied upon the
policy expressed in Sieracki: "[W] e pointed out several times in the Sieracki case,
which has been consistently followed since, that a shipowner's obligation of
seaworthiness cannot be shifted about, limited, or escaped by contracts or by the
absence of contracts and that the shipowner's obligation is rooted, not in
contracts, but in the hazards of the work." 373 U.S. at 414-15 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the "humanitarian policy," rather than the more mechanical
maritime tests, was the starting point in Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,
386 U.S. 724 (1967): "When this Court extended the shipowner's liability for
unseaworthiness to longshoremen performing seamen's work, Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85--either on board or on the pier, Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206, either with the ship's gear or the stevedore's gear, Alaska S.S.
Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, either as employees of an independent stevedore
or as employees of a shipowner pro hac vice, Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410-we
noted that 'the hazards of marine service, the helplessness of the men to ward off
the perils of unseaworthiness, the harshness of forcing them to shoulder their
losses alone, and the broad range of the "humanitarian policy" of the doctrine of
seaworthiness,' id. at 413, should prevent the shipowner from delegating, shifting,
or escaping his duty by using the men or gear of others to perform the ship's
work." 386 U.S. at 728.
Even if, as the Court's majority in the instant case noted, the shipowner's
liability for unseaworthiness is merely shifted to the stevedore company by way
of a third-party action for indemnity, effectively circumventing the state's own
arrangements for compensating industrial accidents, strong policy considerations
still militate in favor of the arrangement. For example, one significant result of
the Ryan indemnity doctrine in cases involving land-based injuries was noted
recently by the Ninth Circuit in Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d
1303 (9th Cir. 1970): "Although the landward extension of unseaworthiness has
been criticized [citations omitted], the overall result has not been unfortunate.
Liability is generally shifted back to the stevedoring company through indemnity
suits, and that company then has an incentive to improve its loading and

unloading equipment." 425 F.2d at 1312. See also Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964). See generally,
Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby": Maritime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20
STAN. L. REV. 423, 445-46 (1968).
47. The instant Court's reasoning that the decision in Gutierrez turned not
upon the "function" the stevedore was performing, i.e. whether or not he was
engaged in loading or unloading, at the time of the injury but rather upon the fact
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Gutierrez4 8 to determine the extent of the shipowner's duty of
seaworthiness. The instant decision, therefore, marks a significant
departure from the policy of distributing the risks of personal injury
of loading and unloading to the users of the shipping industry. Under
the holding in the instant case the only remedy available to a
longshoreman injured ashore during loading or unloading by pierbased equipment of the stevedoring contractor is under the state
workmen's compensation laws. 4 9 The Court's deference to Congress
in such a situation is a novel posture. 10 Morever, while Congress may
be better equipped for precision analysis than a judicial forum, most
courts are aware that state workmen's compensation statutes provide
diminutive benefits compared to jury determinations of personal
injuries," and admiralty courts' evaluations of maritime injuries. 2
Additionally, the theory of limited recovery under state workmen's compensation laws is to offset the imposition of employer
that his injury was caused by an appurtenance of a ship effectively limits future
considerations of the applicability of the doctrine of seaworthiness to dock-side
accidents to a consideration of whether the instrument causing the injury is an
appurtenance of the ship being loaded or unloaded.
48. See cases cited notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text, supra. See also
Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965); Huff v. Matson Navigation Co.,

338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1970).
49. 404 U.S. at 223 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas). See also Nacirema
Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
50. The Court has not deferred to Congress in prior instances approving
longshoremen's recoveries when the Harborworkers' Act or state compensation
schemes were alternatively applicable. See Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410
(1963); Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1954); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); International
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek,
234 U.S. 52 (1914).
Furthermore, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in the instant case,
pointed out that the majority of the instant Court suggested no reason why
deference was needed in the circumstances of the instant case and observed
further: "[R]eferring a litigant to Congress is normally appropriate where the
Court is reluctant to accept his invitation to upset an established rule. Inasmuch as
the Sieracki-Petterson-Gutierrez principle would appear to be the controlling
precedent, the appropriate referral to the legislative process ought to be [by]
Victory Carriers [petitioner-shipowner], not Law [respondent-longshoreman]."
404 U.S. at 224 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
51. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 555 (3d ed. 1964).
52. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY

248-394 (1957).
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liability regardless of fault. The applicability of this theory to factual
situations such as in the instant case is not in keeping with admiralty
courts' traditional solicitude for those injured in the maritime trade. sa
Furthermore, the problems that affording respondent a maritime cause
of action would raise on the standards for and limitations of the
applicability of maritime law to other accidents on land have not
significantly concerned the Court in the recent past. " The obvious
effect of the instant decision is to refuse to many longshoremen an
appropriate and more favorable remedy. ss Certainly, the nature of
the longshoreman's occupation demands a means of compensation for
his injuries that more accurately reflects the hazards of his profession.
The jurisprudential ramifications of the instant decision, however, are
even more significant. First, in a sweeping decision, the Court has
given effect to state workmen's compensation at the expense of
federal maritime law; secondly, the Court has revitalized the gangplank as the basis of choice of law; and, finally, the Court has limited
the scope of the seaworthiness cause of action to injuries arising
within the traditional scope of maritime jurisdiction as extended by a
very narrow interpretation of the Admiralty Extension Act.
Steven M. Lucas

53. See Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755 (No. 3, 930)(Pa. 1789). See also
GILMORE & C.

Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 F. 645 (Ore. 1880). See generally G.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 248-394 (1957).

54. Such problems were easily brushed aside in Gutierrez, in which "[v] arious
far-fetched hypotheticals [were] raised, such as a suit in admiralty for an ordinary
automobile accident involving a ship's officer on ship business in port, or for
someone's slipping on beans that continue to leak from [defective cargo]
bags... in Denver." The Court concluded: "We think it sufficient for the needs
of this occasion to hold that the case is within the maritime jurisdiction under 46
U.S.C. § 740 when ... it is alleged that the shipowner commits a tort while or
before the ship is being unloaded, and the impact of which is felt ashore at a time
and place not remote from the wrongful act." 373 U.S. at 210.
Moreover, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in the instant case, added:
"[i] f a bright-line test is desirable, then the Sieracki policy would be less offended
by a bright-line drawn around both the ship and the dock than by a line cast only
about the vessel. Statistical evidence suggests that the great bulk of high-risk
maritime activity occurs on the ship and the adjoining pier." 404 U.S. at 224-25
(dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas). See also Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc, 432
F.2d 376, 380-83 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. See note 45, supra.
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ANTITRUST-E.E.C.
PRISE BY
MARKET

FIRM
WITH

TREATY-ACQUISITION

HOLDING
EFFECT

AND

MERGER OF ENTER-

A DOMINANT POSITION WITHIN COMMON

OF ELIMINATING

ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL
COMPETITION IN A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMUNITY VIOLATES
ARTICLE 86 OF THE E.E.C. TREATY

A proceeding was initiated under Article 861 of the European
Economic Community (E.E.C.) Treaty by the Commission of the
European Communities (Commission) to determine whether Continental Can Company, Inc. (Continental), U.S.A., had violated the
competition rules of the E.E.C. by its acquisition of Thomassen &
Drijver-Verblifa NV (T.D.V.), a Dutch packaging firm, and the
subsequent merger of T.D.V. with Schmalback-Lubeca-Werke AG
(S.L.W.), a German packaging producer controlled by Continental.
Acting through a holding company incorporated in the United States,
Europemballage Corporation (Europemballage), Continental acquired
91 per cent interest in T.D.V. after having contributed previously its
85 per cent interest in S.L.W. to the same holding company.
Europemballage thus brought together the largest producer of light
metal containers in continental Europe, S.L.W., and the largest
manufacturer of metal containers in the Benelux countries, T.D.V.
The Commission's challenge of the legality of this corporate arrangement on grounds that it eliminated competition was met by

1. While there is no official English translation of the E.E.C. Treaty, the
British Foreign Office translation, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, is
a widely accepted version. The following is the text of article 86 from this
translation:
Any improper exploitation by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall
be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall be
prohibited, in so far as trade between Member states could be affected by it.
The following practices, in particular, shall be deemed to amount to
improper exploitation:
(a)the direct or indirect imposition of any unfair purchase or selling
prices or of any other unfair trading conditions;
(b)the limitation of production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c)the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking
equivalent engagements in commercial transactions, thereby
placing them at a commercial disadvantage;
(d)making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance by
the other party to the contract of additional obligations which by
their nature or according to commercial practice have no connection with the subject of such contract.

Vol. 5-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

Continental's denial that T.D.V. and S.L.W. shared the same geo-

graphical markets. In addition, Continental attacked the Commission's
reliance on article 86 as an anti-merger provision and contended that
the measure was intended to prevent companies from abusing existing
market positions rather than to block mergers.2 In an original
Commission proceeding, held, Continental violated article 86 and
therefore must submit proposals to the Commission for the termination of this violation.' Where an enterprise that holds a dominant
position within the Common Market strengthens its position through
the purchase of a competitor and thereby virtually eliminates actual or
potential competition for that product line in a substantial part of the
Common Market, such merger is an abuse of the dominant position in
violation of article 86 and must therefore be terminated. EEC
Comm'n v. Continental Can Co., 8 E.E.C. J.O. 25 (1972).1
Prior to the instant decision, there was widespread doubt that article
86 of the E.E.C. Treaty could be used to prohibit anti-competitive
mergers and acquisitions.' In fact, the prohibition of monopolistic
mergers within the Common Market cannot be found in explicit terms
but must be implied from the article 86 denunciation of any abusive
exploitation of a dominant position.6 Until recently, this absence of
statutory prohibition and the inclination of the Commission to
proceed cautiously in order to observe and identify unique Community market structure problems probably contributed to the restraint in
active regulation of mergers within the E.E.C. Furthermore, during its
formative years, the E.E.C. desired the rapid economic expansion
inherent in corporate acquisitions and mergers. Nevertheless, the

2. Prior to the completion of this merger, the Commission had warned
T.D.V., S.L.W., and Continental that the contemplated merger might be in
violation of article 86 and it called to the attention of these parties the legal and
financial consequences that might result from the finding of a violation.
3. The decision of the Commission was appealed in February, 1972, to the
Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. Continental has
also submitted to the Commission a formal proposal of settlement in which it
offered to divest itself of some of its manufacturing facilities.
4. For an unofficial English translation see 2 CCH COMM. MK'T REP. 9481
(1972).
5. See, e.g., C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEISS, M. HIRSCH, COMMON
MARKET CARTEL LAW (2d ed. 1971). See also R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION (1970); Markert, Antitrust
Aspects of Mergers in the E.E.C., 5 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 32, 46 (1969).
6. In sharp contrast, the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department
and case precedent provide definitive criteria by which mergers in the United
States may be tailored for compliance.
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Commission has been quietly laying the groundwork for the application of article 86. One critical element of this foundation was the
pronouncement of the basic criteria for the determination of an
unlawful merger. This determination is pitched on a three-pronged
analysis: first, whether the acquiring or acquired enterprise occupies a
dominant position in a substantial part of the Community; secondly,
whether there has been abusive exploitation of that position by virtue
of the merger; and finally, whether there is a possibility of adverse
effects upon trade among the member states of the E.E.C.7 All of these
conditions must be found to exist to constitute a violation.8 While the
term "dominant position" is not defined in article 86, the Commission
has interpreted it to mean the existence of "primarily an economic
power, namely the capability of exerting an influence on the market
that is substantial and in principle foreseeable for the domineering
enterprise." 9 In short, enterprises are deemed to hold a dominant
position when they can take independent courses of action without
consideration of competitors, buyers or suppliers because of market
shares or a combination of market shares and an access to ecnomic,
financial and technical resources. Any consideration of a firm's
dominant position must include a thorough examination of the
relevant markets of the acquiring and the acquired firms.
The firms must both occupy the same product and geographical
markets and one must hold a dominant position in these markets
before article 86 will apply."0 Abusive exploitation is found when a
merger excludes or eliminates competition.1 1 While a merger may
exclude competition but not violate article 86 if there is no dominant
position involved, the closer the enterprise approaches monopolistic
status the greater is the likelihood that its position will become
abusive. Both market behavior and market structure seem to be the

7. See M~morandum de la Commission de la Communautg Economique
Europ~enne sur la concentration des enterprises dans le marchg common, Doc.
Sac (65) 3500 (Dec. 1, 1965). For an English translation see Concentration of
Enterprises in the Common Market: Memorandum of the Commission of the
European Economic Community to the Governments of the Member States, CCH
COMM. MK'T REP. No. 26 (1966).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The product market is defined by functional interchangeability, i.e. all
products that may be reasonably employed for the same purpose. The
geographical market is confined to the Common Market boundaries and must
constitute a substantial part of the Common Market. For a discussion of the
relevant market in article 86 applications, see sources cited note 5 supra.
11. See sources cited note 7 supra.
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target of the law. Finally, there is the requirement that the abuse must
be likely to adversely affect trade between member states of the
Common Market. Thus, if the merger affects trade in only a single
E.E.C. country or only outside the E.E.C., article 86 may not apply.
The Commission has indicated, however, that if one of the enterprises
occupies a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common
Market, the abuse will be presumed to impair interstate trade
regardless of this more specific requirement.1 2
In the instant proceeding, the Commission found that Continental,
through its German subsidiary, S.L.W., held a dominant position in
the German market for light containers by virtue of both market
shares and the group's access to raw materials, capital and technical
resources. 3 Moreover, since T.D.V. also occupied the light container
market and the same geographical market sphere influenced by S.L.W.
activities,' 4 the acquisition of T.D.V. expanded Continental's already
dominant status by eliminating competition in a substantial part of
the Common Market and by reinforcing Continental's financial,
economic and technical capacity. Therefore, the acquisition constituted an abuse of Continental's dominant position. Furthermore,
because T.D.V. and S.L.W. had been capable of competing with each
other in Germany and in the Benelux countries, the Commission
found that the merger's foreclosure of this possibility could impair the
flow of trade between member states of the E.E.C. The Commission
therefore concluded that the prerequisites for a violation of article 86
had been satisfied.
The instant decision is one of first impression for the Commission.
Before this decision, the E.E.C.'s market structure objectives had been
only vaguely articulated: first, there should be a sufficient number of
enterprises to insure effective competition; and secondly, these
enterprises should be large enough to cope with problems of research,
production and marketing.'" Article 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty provided
little guidance because it did not address the subject in explicit
language. Thus, both law and policy produced an environment

12. Id.

13. In particular, the Commission cited Continental's manufacture of
machinery used in the canning process, its patents and technical know-how and its
access to the international capital markets as factors which contributed to its
subsidiary's (S.L.W.) domination of the market.
14. S.L.W. and T.D.V. each competed indirectly through subsidiaries in the
home territory of the other.
15. E. Sassen, Ensuring Fair Competition in the European Community, 35
COMMUNITY

ToPics (1970).
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conducive to foreign corporate mergers and acquisitions within the
Community. Accordingly, these proliferated rapidly. With the instant
decision, the Commission has established a concrete anti-monopoly
precedent by which foreign corporate investors may gauge with more
certainty their plans for expansion and by which E.E.C. enterprises
may at least roughly channel their growth. The effects of this
pronouncement upon future E.E.C. market structure are not yet
apparent, but a review of United States' anti-merger law experiences
may yield valuable insight into the problems that the Community may
soon confront. Until the 1950 amendment, section 7 of the Clayton
Act1 6 had minimal effects on U.S. mergers. As a result, concentrations and oligopolies abound in U.S. business today. However, with
the passage of the 1950 amendment and stronger judicial application,
more effective control has been asserted over both horizontal and
vertical mergers. Unfortunately, unexpected side effects have surfaced.
The overwhelming success of the post-1950 Clayton Act often has
discouraged attempts at "borderline" mergers that could have been
beneficial to competition. Furthermore, this successful enforcement
has spawned the conglomerate merger, which, until recently, was
immune from close scrutiny because it did not involve problems 1of
7
competition between the merging firms or of vertical relationships.
Responding to the threat of the conglomerates' massing of economic

power into a few hands, government has recently challenged several
such acquisitions. The E.E.C. could profit from a study of antimonopoly experiences not only in the United States, but also in other
industrialized countries such as Japan, England and its own member
states of the Community. From such a study it could knowledgeably
extend the principle of the instant decision to shape a comprehensive
plan for proper corporate expansion."8 Another facet of market
policing is the effect it may have on transnational business relationships. Perhaps purposefully, the Commission did not distinguish
between domestic mergers and mergers involving foreign enterprises.
This vagueness leaves the Commission wide discretion in applying
16. For an excellent discussion of the Clayton Act and an illustration of its
application to anti-competitive mergers see The Energy Crisis: The Need for
Antitrust Action and FederalRegulation, 24 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1971).
17. According to the Federal Trade Commission, conglomerate mergers
accounted for almost 90 per cent of the total assets involved in large acquisitions
in 1968. FTC STAFF REPORT, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE
MERGERS (1969).
18. See Rahl, Competition and Antitrust in American Economic Policy: Are
There Useful Lessons for Europe?, 8 C.M.L. REV. 284 (1971); Canellos and
Silber, Concentrationin the Common Market, 7 C.M.L. REv. 5 (1970).
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article 86. A harsh anti-merger policy directed toward foreign firms
would be likely to cause them to enter the E.E.C. through internal
expansion rather than by acquisition, thus denying Community
enterprises access to foreign capital and technical advancements. 9
This could be especially damaging to the E.E.C. at its present stage of
rapid expansion and could stimulate the adoption of protectionist
policies throughout the international business community. In contrast,
a non-discriminatory policy applying to foreign and domestic firms
alike could defeat the very integration of European enterprises that
Common Market policies are designed to encourage."0 While this

integration is necessary for effective competition in international
trade, it could produce oligopolies and their attendant problems
within the E.E.C. domestic market. Thus, both domestic and foreign
trade requirements should be examined before selecting corporate
targets for anti-monopoly regulation. With this decision, the Commission has embarked on a treacherous voyage through the vaguely
charted waters of corporate market regulation. Nonetheless, by
thoughtful study of various national anti-monopoly experiences and
through careful definition of its objectives for an ideal market
structure, the Community can avoid the deleterious effects of
over-regulation or under-regulation and thereby enhance the early
realization of its primary goal: a single market throughout the
European Community. 2
John D. Arterberry

19. Recent articles in business magazines have discussed the possible
transnational business effects of the E.E.C. antimerger action against Continental.
See, e.g., 98 DUN's, No. 6, at 61-65 (1971); BUsINESS WEEK, Dec. 18, 1971, at
37-40.
20. See THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST PROJECT OF
THE

SPECIAL

COMMITTEE

ON

THE

EUROPEAN

COMMON

MARKET

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 4 BUSINESS
REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS 175-81 (J.Rahled. 1970).

ASSOCIATION

OF THE BAR

21. See, e.g., Maier, Book Review, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 150 (1972).
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ANTITRUST-STANDING-FOREIGN

NATION HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR

TREBLE DAMAGES

Plaintiff,'

a foreign nation, brought a private antitrust action

against a corporate defendant 2 to recover treble damages for
defendant's alleged price fixing in the sale of antibiotics to plaintiff.'
In a pretrial proceeding, defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the plaintiff--a foreign nation-was not a "person" within the
meaning of antitrust law entitled to bring a treble damage action.4
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, held,
motion denied. A foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the
Clayton Act' and is entitled to bring a private antitrust action for
treble damages. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The definition of "person" under the Clayton Act "include[s]
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of

either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of
any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 6 The legislative history
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, however, does not reveal whether
Congress intended that a foreign nation, per se, be included within the
scope of this definition. In United States v. Cooper Corp., the

Supreme Court held that the United States was not a "person"
entitled to sue for treble damages under the Clayton Act. 7 The Court
ruled that in the common, ordinary and natural sense the term
"person" does not include the United States.' In Georgia v. Evans, the
1. Plaintiff is the State of Kuwait. The United States maintains diplomatic
relations with this small Arabic country whose oil reserves are estimated to be
15% of the world's supply. THE 1972 WORLD ALMANAC 554 (1971). It is

noteworthy that the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in behalf of
plaintiff.
2. Charles Pfizer & Company.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
4. 15 U.S.C. § § 7, 12 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
7. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
8. The Cooper opinion set forth the following guidelines for determining what
was meant by "person": "[T]he [d]ecision is not to be reached by a strict
construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of
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Supreme Court held that a state of the United States is a "person"
entitled to the Clayton Act's treble damages.9 In the Evans decision,
Justice Frankfurter distinguished Cooper on grounds that the considerations on which Cooper was decided were entirely lacking in
Evans, " that the state was otherwise without redress for antitrust
violations against it, and that Congress would have had no reason to
deprive a state of the United States the civil remedy of treble damages.
In recent decisions the Court had voiced strong support for the
continuing vitality of a private cause of action for treble damages in
order to help in the enforcement of United States antitrust laws. "
The court in the instant case perceived that the real issue was
whether the maintenance of this action was essential to the effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws. In deciding that the standing of a

construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its
ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not
only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all
other aids to construction. But it is not our function to engraft on a statute
additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made."
312 U.S. at 605. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, stressed the policy
aspects of the decision and criticized the Court's strict construction of a remedial
statute. In 1955 Congress partially relieved thissituation by permitting the United
States to sue for actual damages when injured in its business or property due to an
antitrust violation. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970).
9. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
10. "The State of Georgia, unlike the United States, cannot prosecute
violations of the Sherman Law. Nor can it seize property transported in defiance
of it." 316 U.S. at 162.
11. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134 (1968); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968). More recently, however, the Court has carved out from the possible treble
damage actions those brought by a state of the United States for injury to its
general economy under the theory of parens patriae. Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 40 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. March 1, 1972), aff'g 431 F.2d
1282 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969). The Court held
that § 4 of the Clayton Act does not authorize a state to sue for treble
damages for an injury to its general economy allegedly attributable to a violation
of the antitrust laws. Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
reaffirmed the need to encourage potential litigants to serve as "private
attorneys-general" to maintain the strong competitive atmosphere required by a
healthy and vigorous free enterprise system. Justice Douglas, dissenting, chided
the decision as being "a miserly approach to the fashioning of federal
remedies.. ." and agreed with Justice Brennan that the otherwise controlling case
of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) should not be distinguished
on a mere technicality. Id. at 4251.
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foreign nation to sue for treble damages was essential, the court
emphasized that the treble damage provision was intended to
encourage private enforcement of antitrust legislation. 12 In addition,
the court regarded the grant of the protections of our antitrust laws to
foreign nations as good foreign policy. 13 Following the reasoning of
Justice Black in his Cooper dissent, the court noted that Congress
would not have wanted to deprive a foreign nation of such right of
action. The court recognized that even in foreign markets unchecked
antitrust violations such as price fixing have adverse effects on

domestic competition: excessive profits in foreign sales build up the
strength of a domestic operation and thereby create an unfair
advantage over domestic competitors. In its order denying the

defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that there was a
substantial ground for difference of opinion on the controlling
question of law in this case, and therefore suggested an immediate
appeal, as provided by statute. 14
The court's opinion was unexpectedly brief in its treatment of
such an important decision on an issue of first impression. 1" Despite
its brevity, the decision of the court was sound. The instant case is
distinguishable from Cooper and properly follows the policy
consideration approach of Evans. The United States does not need a

12. E.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968).
13. A principle of comity in both international law and American constitutional law is the privilege of a recognized foreign nation to sue in the courts of
another nation. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides: "When a district judge, in
making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall
be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,
however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge.., shall so order."
15. Several factors contributed to the brevity of the opinion. First, there was
a definite lack of primary authority on the issue involved. The parties stipulated
that the only cases relevant to the decision were Cooper and Evans. Secondly, the
instant case had been grouped with other actions into coordinated pretrial
proceedings. Thirdly, the court stated explicitly that it was anticipated that the
case would be appealed.
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treble damage remedy because other remedies, which include single
damages, criminal prosecution, seizure of property and injunction, are
at its disposal. The United States does not need the encouragement of
treble damages to bring suit because it has available the necessary
resources and talent to decrease the risk of losing an antitrust action.
Foreign nations, unlike the United States, need the incentive of treble
damages to bring private antitrust litigation because they lack the
inherent expertise in American antitrust law and would be bringing a
costly suit away from home. A foreign nation would have no remedy
in United States' courts other than treble damages for injury to its
business or property. Denial of a legal remedy in the United States
could force a foreign nation to consider other remedies that would be
against the interests of the United States, such as confiscation of the

company's assets. Like states of the United States, foreign nations are
not expressly named as "persons" who can maintain treble damage
suits. Since the Supreme Court has recognized, however, that it is
consonant with the policy and intent of the antitrust laws for states of
the United States to sue for treble damages, this same reasoning
should be recognized when the suit is brought by foreign nations.
Moreover, Congress explicitly provided that foreign corporations have
standing to sue for treble damages. 16 Furthermore, foreign corporations wholly owned by a foreign government also have standing to
sue. 17 Since there is no material difference between foreign corporations owned by foreign governments and the foreign governments
themselves being allowed to sue for treble damages, the latter should
be granted standing.
Clifford Love III

16. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).

17. See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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CONSTITUTIONAL
SION

WHICH

LAW-ALIENS-STATE

DISCRIMINATES

ALIENAGE NEITHER INVADES

ON

LAW OF INTESTATE SUCCES-

THE

BASIS

OF

NON-RESIDENT

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER NOR

VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Claimants,1
citizen-residents of the U.S.S.R., sought their
proportionate share of a decedent's estate2 in an heirship proceeding.
Claimants' interest became known when they allegedly "appeared and
demanded" at a time in excess of five years from the alleged
intestate's death. The trial court found that the claimants had not
sufficiently proved their relation to the intestate. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case on the grounds of judicial error.3 On
remand, claimants contended that section 1026 of the California
Probate Code4 unconstitutionally invaded the federal foreign relations
power and violated the fourteenth amendment.' The state argued that
the statute was constitutional, notwithstanding its provision that a
non-resident alien must "appear and demand" his interest in an estate
within five years from the date of death, although all other persons are
allowed five years from the decree of distribution. The trial court
found for the claimants. The court of appeals reversed.6 The Supreme
1. U.A. Gumen, E.A. Lavrik, A.I. Petlevany, and V.I. Vinichenko.
2. John Horman died intestate on December 25, 1961, leaving an estate of
over $450,000. Twenty-four persons asserted an interest in the estate.
3. In re Estate of Horman, 265 Cal. App. 2d 796, 71 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Ct. App.
1968).
4. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1026 (West 1956) provides that "[a] nonresident
alien who becomes entitled to property by succession must appear and demand

the property within five years from the time of succession; otherwise, his rights
are barred and the property shall be disposed of as escheated property."
5. Additionally, claimants contended that the statute should be tolled under
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583 (West 1956) which provides that a statute may be
tolled where there is legal or physical impossibility or futility in commencing an
action. Claimants urged that it would have been futile for them to have brought
an action in California until August 2, 1966; therefore, the statute should be
tolled until that time. The claimants argued that they "appeared and demanded"
on March 17, 1967, within the five year period not counting the time while the
statute was tolled. There had been a decision in effect from September 12, 1961,
until August 2, 1966, which held that reciprocal rights of inheritance did not exist
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal.
App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1961). Gogabashi'ele's decision was
disapproved on August 2, 1966, by In re Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d 60, 416 P.2d

473, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1966).
6. In re Estate of Horman, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 90 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Ct. App.

1970).
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Court of California, held, affirmed. A state law of intestate succession
that limits the timeliness of a claim on the basis of the non-resident
alienage of the claimant does not invade federal foreign relations
power or violate the equal protection or due process provisions of the
fourteenth amendment. In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d
785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1971).
A consideration of whether a state statute involving inheritance
rights of non-resident aliens invades the federal foreign relations power
manifests two conflicting principles of law: although the states have
the sole power to regulate inheritance standards, 7 the federal
government has the exclusive power to conduct foreign relations.' A
constitutional clash has occurred between these two principles as a
result of several forms of state action. Several states have enacted
probate statutes with specific standards for non-resident aliens. In
construing these statutes numerous state probate courts have
extrajudicially commented upon the relative merits of foreign judicial
and political processes. 9 In the leading case of Clark v. Allen, 'o the
United States Supreme Court held that a California statute concerning
non-resident alien inheritance rights and containing a general
reciprocity clause did not on its face unconstitutionally intrude into
the federal domain. A similar statute of the state of Oregon, however,
was held unconstitutional in Zschernig v. Miller. " The court
expressly declined to overrule Clark, distinguishing Zschernig on the
grounds that the Oregon statute had more than an "incidental or
indirect effect" 12 on foreign affairs because of its manner of
7. See In re Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d 60, 416 P.2d 473, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441
(1966).
8. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Concerning the federal
government's domination of foreign affairs, see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 229-30 (1941); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1940) (indicating
that the federal government must be entirely free from local interference). But cf.,
Zschernig v. Miller, supra at 433 (a state court may properly perform its function
of applying the laws of foreign nations although there is a remote possibility that
an opinion may "disturb a foreign nation").
9. See Belemeich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 508-11, 192 A.2d 740, 741-43 (1963).
See also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1968); Heyman, The
Non-resident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw.
U.L. REV. 221, 234 (1957).

10. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
11. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See, e.g., Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal
Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

133, 139-41 (1971).
12. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). See, e.g., Maier, supra note 11,

at 138 for a complete discussion of the Clark test.
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application. 13 Recent cases continue to employ the Clark test of
incidental or indirect effect. 14 While the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment applies to "any person," '" it is unclear
whether a non-resident alien with property1 6 in the United States is
entitled to the due process protections. 7 Assuming that a
non-resident alien with a property interest within the United States is
protected by the due process clause, the question remains whether the
property interest that a non-resident alien has in a decedent's estate
prior to "appearing and demanding" is "property" 18 within the

meaning of the due process clause. Although the Supreme Court has
not directly dealt with this question, in Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States,'9 the Court considered a non-resident alien's claim that

was based upon a contract to build ships. The Court held that the
contractual claim was "property" protected by the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. 20 Moreover, while the equal protection

13.

Cf. Snouffer, Nonresident Alien Inheritance Statutes and Foreign

Policy-A Conflict?, 47 ORE. L. REV. 390 (1968) (criticizes the Zschernig
decision).
14. E.g., Shames v. State, 323 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Neb. 1971). See also
Maier, supra note 11, at 141-51.
15. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides, "...nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
16. The meaning of "property" in the due process clause "has been defined to
include every interest anyone may have in any and everything that is the subject
of ownership by man.. . ." Father Basil's Lodge v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246,
256, 65 N.E.2d 805, 812 (1946).
17. Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521, 528 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (citing
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), the district court stated that aliens outside
the United States cannot complain of a lack of due process or equal protection of
the law); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931);
Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that non-resident aliens owning property in the United States are entitled
to the protection of the fifth amendment's due process guarantees).
18. California law allows property to pass to a non-resident alien heir only if
the alien appears and demands his interest therein. Such an estate is subject to the
condition subsequent that upon the failure to make such an appearance, the
property vests in the state. In re Pendergast's Estate, 143 Cal. 135, 76 P. 962
(1904).
19. 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
20. The Russian Volunteer Fleet decision is persuasive authority for the

proposition that a non-resident alien with property in the United States is entitled
to the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee assuming that the definition
Vol. 5-No. 2
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clause protects resident aliens, 21 the precise meaning of the phrase
"any person within its jurisdiction" has not been conclusively
determined by the Supreme Court. 22 Whether the Court perceives any
difference between the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
and equal protection clause in terms of the class of persons protected
by them is unclear. This problem is compounded by the tendency of
courts to speak of "aliens" when the precise term should be "resident
aliens." To satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause, a
state statute's classification, which involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental interest, must reasonably fulfill a
lawful state purpose with a rational relation between the purpose of
the statute and its classification. 23 If the statute's classification is
"suspect," the statute must withstand the compelling state interest test
and a much higher degree of judicial scrutiny. 24 While alienage is a

of property for the fifth amendment does not differ materially from the
definition of property for the fourteenth amendment.
21. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that the term
"person" includes lawfully admitted residentaliens); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
39 (1915) (Arizona law forbidding employment to an alien who was a lawful
inhabitant held repugnant to the equal protection clause, since the alien was "a
person within its jurisdiction"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(holding that fourteenth amendment's protections attached to alien who was
within the territorial jurisdiction of California, regardless of his lack of
citizenship). Note the varying formulations of what is meant by "a person within
its jurisdiction" set out in the emphasized phrases.
22. See generally Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5-10 (1960). "Within
its jurisdiction" was first defined as physically present within the state's territorial
limits; next, it was defined as within the jurisdiction of the state's courts; finally,
the second definition was modified to one that appears before a state's courts.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898); Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S.
544 (1923).
23. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
24. See generally Note, Developments-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1127-31 (1969). A line of recent Supreme Court cases calls for extreme
judicial scrutiny where a suspect classification exists. This standard has three
requirements: reasonable relation of the classification to a permissible legislative
purpose; sufficient precision in the application of the classification to achieve its
purpose efficiently; and the necessity of the classification to promote a
compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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suspect classification,

25

it is unclear whether non-resident alienage is

also "suspect."
The court in the instant case ruled that section 1026 of the
California Probate Code is constitutional on the basis that the impact
on foreign relations is merely indirect or incidental, thereby
distinguishing Zschernig on the facts. 26 Further, the court ruled that a
non-resident alien's interest in an inheritance is not protected by the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, since that interest is
conditional and not vested. Finally, the court found no violation of
the equal protection clause, assuming that the claimants were "persons
within its jurisdiction." The court discerned no fundamental interest
or suspect classification that would trigger the application of the
stricter standard of judicial scrutiny. The court concluded that while
alienage was a suspect classification, non-resident alienage was not.
Since the purpose of the statute was to promote ascertainable title to
property within the state, this purpose was rationally related to the
non-resident classification, 27 and the statute did not violate the equal
protection clause.
The instant case raises, but does not adequately resolve, two major
questions of constitutional dimension. The first question concerns the
extent to which a state statute has more than an "incidental or

25. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

26. Judge Kaufman pointed out that the application of the statute in the
present case involved none of the judicial excursions into the federal government's
foreign relations power that the Zschernig decision had intended to eradicate.
Additionally, the court held that the statute was not tolled and that the state
was not estopped to assert the provisions of § 1026. The court declined to
comment on claimants' contention that the taking of their property by the state
was contrary to international standards of justice.
Customary international law should be regarded by both state and federal
courts as part of the "law of the land." Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740-43 (1939); See
Maier, supra note 11, at 171-72. The United States recognizes as part of the
international standards of justice that a state's taking of an alien's property for no
public purpose, or without reasonable provision for compensation, or when the
property is merely in transit through a state, is wrongful. Unjust discrimination
against aliens exists where a state injuriously discriminates against aliens generally,
against aliens of a particular nationality, or against a specific individual because he
is an alien. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§
165, 185, 191 (1965).
27. Because of the distance and expense involved, as well as a probable lack of
contacts, a non-resident alien is less likely to appear and demand his interest in the
estate within the five year mandatory period.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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indirect" impact on foreign relations. 2 The Clark test emphasizes a
factual determination of the effect that a state statute will have on
foreign relations. This approach reduces the court's role to that of
speculation. In addition to the extent of the impact of a state statute,
another element needs to be added to the Clark test to aid the courts
in making a more reliable determination. 29 This element would
balance the possible adverse transnational repercussions of the statute
against the interest a state may have in the continued existence of its
law. The court in the instant case found that the impact on foreign
relations of section 1026 was "incidental or indirect." Having
admitted an impact, the court should have then determined whether
this impact was reasonable in relation to the importance of section
1026 to California's maintenance of its inheritance standards. The
second major question concerns claimants' status under the fourteenth
amendment. The seemingly universal scope of the term "any person"
as used in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
accepted by the Court in the Russian Volunteer Fleet30

decision

suggests that both resident and non-resident aliens with property
interests within the United States must be accorded due process
protection. In comparison, the wording of the equal protection clause
indicates that non-resident aliens in general, and especially those
physically outside the jurisdiction of the state, are not to be so
protected. The question then becomes whether claimants, such as

those in the instant case, are to be accorded due process, but not equal
protection, of law. While the protective scope of these two clauses of
the Constitution remains undefined with respect to non-resident
aliens, the congressional history of the fourteenth amendment,3 1 the
similarity of the protection provided by the two clauses, 32 and the
recent decision of Bozanich v. Reetz,33 which extends the definition of

28. See Maier, supra note 11, at 133.
29. Id. at 163-73.
30. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
31. J.

JAMES,

THE FRAMING

OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT

(1956).
32. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). This companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education held that the concepts of equal protection and due
process of law are not mutually exclusive. While noting that the fifth amendment
does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the fourteenth, the Court
reasoned that the concepts of equal protection and due process both stem from
our ideal of fundamental fairness. Therefore, the class of persons accorded the
fifth amendment's due process protections, which include equal protection,
should reasonably be the same as that of the fourteenth amendment.
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"within its jurisdiction," are persuasive authority for the argument
that there is little difference in the classes of persons to whom the due
process and equal protection clauses apply. Secondly, the court
construed the claimants' succession right too narrowly by finding that
a conditional interest in an estate is not property within the scope of
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The constitutional
validity of that determination is especially questionable in light of the
equal protection claim. Because the claimants are held to a much
stricter standard than that to which citizens and resident aliens are
bound, discrimination on the basis of non-resident alienage is
compounded by a narrow definition of property. Finally, a large
degree of confusion has resulted from the court's failure to distinguish
among non-resident aliens having property within the United States,
non-resident aliens physically present within the United States, and all
other non-resident aliens. As in the instant case, the courts have not
sufficiently considered these distinctions in reaching their decisions.
Because non-resident aliens in general are at a legal disadvantage as a
"discrete and insular minority," 4 the policy of protecting minority
rights should demand that the suspect category of alienage include
non-resident aliens physically present within the jurisdiction and
non-resident aliens having property therein. The conclusion that only
resident aliens should be protected by the due process clause is
supported by the argument that the courts should not attempt to
extend the protection of American constitutional rights to the entire
world, but only to the residents and citizens that comprise our
society. However, the better reasoned rule is that not only resident

aliens but also non-resident aliens either with property rights within
the jurisdiction or physically present therein should be recognized as
being within a suspect category of alienage. This rule would not
extend the constitutional protections beyond practical limits and
would be a fundamentally fair method of protecting domestic
property that is owned by foreign interests. As a suspect classification,
non-resident alienage would raise the strict standard of review.
Although section 1026 does not create an unreasonable classification,
there is certainly no compelling state interest that would sustain its

33. 297 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Alas. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
Non-resident citizens were allowed to invoke the equal protection clause against
another state's fishing laws, although they were not actually "within the
jurisdiction." The Supreme Court vacated the decision on grounds of abstention.
34. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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constitutionality. The court was confronted with a formidable array
of constitutional questions and a paucity of well-defined rules of law
to apply. By adding a balancing element to the Clark test and
recognizing non-resident aliens either with property in a jurisdiction or
physically present therein as within a suspect classification, these
difficult constitutional issues could be rendered more manageable for
future courts.
Clifford Love III
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INSURANCE-CONFLICT OF
GIVEN

LAWS-CUBAN

EXTRATERRITORIAL

EFFECT TO

MONETARY CONTROL LAWS
DENY

AMERICAN

CITIZENS

THE BENEFITS OF POLICIES ISSUED IN CUBA

Plaintiffs, beneficiaries of two life insurance policies, alleged that
defendant, a Canadian life insurance company,' had breached its
insurance contracts by refusing to pay the death benefit proceeds in
United States dollars. 2 Plaintiffs and the deceased insured 3 were
American citizens residing in Cuba4 when the policies were issued, but
after Castro assumed power they fled Cuba and returned to the United

1. Defendant is organized under the laws of Canada and its head office is in
Toronto. From 1909 until 1959, defendant issued and serviced policies for Cuban
residents through an unincorporated branch office in Havana. Insurance applica-

tions obtained by defendant's Cuban agents were forwarded to the head office in
Toronto for acceptance or rejection. Even before Castro assumed control, Cuban
law required defendant to render quarterly and annual reports of its operations,

maintain a register of all Cuban policies, and make a $25,000 deposit with the
government. There was a tax advantage to defendant in making investments in
Cuba, but no law required it to do so. Defendant had written no new policies in
Cuba since Castro's take-over, and maintained merely a token staff to service
existing policies and to pay death benefits in Cuba.
2. The complaint contained two counts. In the first count, set out in the text,
Johansen sued as the executor of his wife's estate. His wife was the daughter of
the insured and the named beneficiary of one of the policies, but she died before
this action had commenced. The widow of the insured, named beneficiary of a
second policy, joined Johansen on this count. The court's disposition of the first
count was controlling on the second count, in which Johansen sought a
declaration that the defendant was obliged to accept premium payments, make
policy loans, and pay the proceeds upon his death in United States dollars on a
third policy of which he was the owner-insured.
3. Thomas Francis Turull y Belling, the deceased-insured, purchased one
policy in 1937 and the other in 1939. Each policy carried a death benefit of
$25,000 U.S. Turull paid the premiums in dollars until 1948 or 1949, and
thereafter and until his death paid in pesos. The total dollar value paid by Turull
exceeded the face amounts of these policies.
4. Both Johansen and Turull were born in Brooklyn, New York, and remained
American citizens throughout their residency in Cuba. Turull went to Cuba in
1911 and founded an export-import business there. His wife was a Cuban by
birth, but she later became a naturalized American citizen. In 1941, Johansen
married one of Turull's daughters, who was also an American citizen. Upon
discharge from the United States Air Force after World War II, Johansen moved
with his wife to Cuba and began to work for his father-in-law. Both Turull and
Johansen owned property in New York and frequently lived there with their
families during Cuba's hot summer months.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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States. Upon the death of the insured in New York in 1961, plaintiffs
demanded that the policy proceeds be paid in New York in United
States currency as stipulated in the contracts.' Defendant refused and
declared that Cuban law 6 required only that it pay in pesos in Cuba.7
The federal district court found that Cuban law governed the
performance of these policies and, consequently, defendant was only
required to discharge its obligations in pesos in Cuba.' On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held,
affirmed. New York public policy is not offended where Cuban law,

5, Each of these policies provided that "[AIIl sums payable or [receivable]
under this policy shall be paid in lawful currency of the United States of
America." Further, with respect to place of payment, each policy stated "[AIIl
sums payable [receivable] under the policy shall be paid at... Havana, Republic
of Cuba." Plaintiff alleged that it was defendant's policy and a part of the "sales
pitch" to Americans living in Cuba that the policies would be honored in the
United States if the buyer returned there. The company did transfer some policies
on request from Cuba to New York prior to Castro's currency control laws. See
note 6 infra.
6. From 1914 to 1939, both the United States dollar and the peso were legal
tender in Cuba. The value of the peso had diminished by 1939 and the Cuban
Government, in order to bolster the sagging peso, enacted a law making the dollar
and the peso interchangeable on a one-to-one basis. On June 30, 1951, Cuban
Monetary Decree No. 1384 became effective (pursuant to Law No. 13 of
December 13, 1948), requiring all contracts theretofore payable in dollars in Cuba
to be payable only in pesos. All obligations formerly denominated in United
States currency were then changed to pesos, the sole legal tender in Cuba. In
accordance with Law No. 13 of 1948, defendant-insurer notified its policyholders
that all policies that had referred to American currency would be payable only in
Cuban pesos. Johansen and Turull raised no objection to payment in pesos. After
Castro's ascension, Law No. 568 was enacted making it a criminal offense to hold
dollars in Cuba. All foreign residents' bank accounts were frozen and all dollars
held in savings accounts were required to be changed into pesos. Law No. 930 of
February 26, 1961, provided that obligations which by agreement were made
payable in any other currency were now payable only in pesos.
7. Defendant wanted to pay in pesos because it had invested Cuban
policyholders' premiums in Cuban assets in order to meet its obligation from these
investments. Such performance was totally worthless to plaintiffs. United States
citizens are prohibited from travelling to Cuba or from handling United States
currency there. 447 F.2d at 178. Moreover, even if no United States laws
prohibited such conduct, the pesos could not be removed from Cuba under Cuban
monetary control laws. See note 6 supra. Finally, even if it were possible to pay in
pesos and in New York, plaintiffs would not have had the benefit of their bargain
because pesos were worthless in exchange for dollars.
8. Johansen v. Confederation Life Association, 312 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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under which the policies were issued and governed, is given extraterri-

torial effect. Johansen v. Confederation Life Association, 447 F.2d
175 (2d Cir. 1971).
During the past decade several cases having factual similarities to
the instant case 9 have been litigated. The resulting decisions have not
been harmonious.' ° In general, the ratio decidendi of these cases has
been predicated upon one of three distinct approaches. The first of
these approaches has been based upon the International Monetary
Fund." Insurers averred that the Cuban monetary control laws were
consistent with the International Monetary Fund Agreement, to which
the United States and Cuba were signatory members. Consequently,
9. The instant case is distinguishable from the earlier cases involving Cuban
insurance policies in that this is the first such case to be brought by United States
citizens. Plaintiffs in the other cases were Cuban national refugees now residing in
the United States.
10. See, e.g., Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1966) (act of state doctrine and IMF held not to preclude recovery by insured);
Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 915 (1964) (Florida court obligated by IMF agreement to apply Cuban Law
to the performance provisions of the contract); Martinez v. Crown Life Ins. Co.,
109 Ga. App. 602, 136 S.E.2d 912 (1964) (act of state doctrine invoked to deny
insured recovery); Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161
So. 2d 70 (1964) (act of state doctrine, IMF, and Cuban monetary control laws
held not applicable to deny insured the benefits of his fully performed contract);

Varas v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 176, 203 A.2d 505 (1964) (cash
surrender values option construed as a continuing offer that was accepted by the
insured in the United States and the law of the place of performance was held to
govern); Imperial Life Assurance Co. v. Colmenares, [1967] 62 D.L.R.2d 138
(Can. Sup. Ct. 1967) (the insurance contract was made by insurer's acceptance
and decision to "go on risk" in Canada; Canadian law therefore governed). For an
extensive discussion of these and related cases, see Paradise, Cuban Refugee
Insureds and the Articles of the InternationalMonetary Fund, 18 U. FLA. L.
REV. 29 (1965); Note, InternationalLaw: Insurance Claims on Policies of Cuban
Nationals, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455 (1963); Comment, 4 TEXAS INT'L L.F.
231 (1968).
11. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a special agency of the United
Nations, created at the close of World War II for the purpose of avoiding
international economic chaos. Member nations of the Fund agree not to impose
restrictions on payment for current international transactions and to maintain a
fully convertible currency. The Articles of Agreement specifically proscribe any
unauthorized restrictions by member states. Furthermore, the Agreement stipulates that unauthorized restrictions are unenforceable in the courts of any member
state. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, art. VIII § 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; Paradise,
supra note 10.
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the United States must enforce insurance contract provisions altered
by Cuban law or be in violation of the I.M.F. agreement. In addition,
the insurers argued that they had a right to rely on the Cuban
monetary laws, that the enforcement of the insurance contracts would
allow Cuban nationals to circumvent Cuban law, and that the
enforcement of the insurance contracts would cause the insurer to
violate Cuban law. 2 Although available as a defense to insurers in the
early 1960's,'" Cuba's withdrawal from the Fund has now rendered
this approach nugatory.' 4 The second approach has been to rely upon
the act of state doctrine in order to give effect to Cuban law. This
doctrine prevents the courts of the United States from refusing to give
effect to foreign laws and decrees which affect property and persons
under the control of the foreign sovereign."5 Insurers argued that
since the enactment of monetary control laws by Cuba was a valid
exercise of state power, the United States courts should not be
permitted to enforce contracts in contravention of present Cuban

12. The real basis for these arguments was the insurance companies' fear that
the Cuban Government would confiscate their assets in Cuba in retaliation for
their having made payments to exiled Cuban nationals. See Paradise, supra note
10.
13. See Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert.

denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964). Contra, Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So.
2d 785 (Fla. App. 1963); Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La.

755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964).
14. Cuba became a member of the Fund in 1953, but withdrew on April 2,
1964. Its withdrawal came on the verge of mandatory expulsion for failure to

discharge its obligations in accordance with the Articles of Agreement. "It is
settled that the laws of a nonmember nation are not given extraterritorial effect
by the terms and conditions of the [International Monetary Fund]." Confedera-

tion Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan, 207 So. 2d 33, 38 (Fla. App. 1968); cf.
Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 31 Misc. 2d 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (court held that there was no obligation to give extraterritorial effect to
monetary control laws of Czechoslovakia, a former member of the IMF).
15. "Our courts will not examine a foreign law to determine whether it was
adopted in conformity with the internal procedures and requirements of the
enacting state." French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d
704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968). The now classic statement of the act of state
doctrine was first announced in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897): "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Accord,
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 266 N.Y. 71,
193 N.E. 897 (1934).
Spring, 1972

RECENT DECISIONS

law.' 6 The act of state doctrine has not been found applicable in most
cases, however, because a judgment for the insured would not affect
the integrity of Cuban law. 7 The third and most common approach
has been to apply conflict of laws rules. Traditionally, matters relating
to the execution of the contract are governed by the law of the place
where the contract is made, while matters relating to performance are
governed by the law of the place of performance. 8 In Auten v.
Auten, New York broke the bonds of the traditional conflicts rules of
contracts by adopting the "grouping of contacts" or "center of

gravity" approach. 9 Under this theory, the law of the state or
country having the greatest number of significant contacts would be
adopted regardless of the physical place of making or of performance
of the contract. More recently, the "greatest interest" theory has

evolved in New York as the appropriate conflicts rule.2"

This

16. Martinez v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 602, 136 S.E.2d 912
(1964) (court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Sabbatino case left it
no choice but to apply the act of state doctrine); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
17. 447 F.2d at 180. See Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1966) (court held that recovery was not precluded by the act of state
doctrine. Moreover, the contractual rights "were not expropriated and probably
could not have been."). Accord, Oliva v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 448 F.2d
217 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E.2d 992, 995
(1939). See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372,
248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1969) (dictum). See generally 1 CoucH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 3:1 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1959); 3
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 319 (2d ed.

1958).
19. The leading case for the "center of gravity" conflicts rule is Auten v.
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). There, the court found that England
had the greatest number of significant contacts in this property settlement case
and was more intimately concerned with the outcome of the litigation than New
York. See, e.g., Fleet Messenger Service, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,
315 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1963) (adoption of the "grouping of contacts" rule in
situations having elements connected with more than one jurisdiction); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (court
rejected the "situs of the tort" test in diversity tort action and adopted the
"center of gravity" rule). See also Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d
399 (2d Cir. 1963); Royce Chemical Co. v. Sharples Corp., 285 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1960).
20. "[T] he rule that has evolved clearly in our most recent decisions is that
the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation will be
applied and that the facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State
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approach allows the court to apply the law of the jurisdiction having
the greatest interest in the outcome of the particular litigation. In
contracts cases, two important factors that are considered by the
courts in deciding which jurisdiction's law to apply are the domicile of
the party seeking recovery 2
and the public policy of the forum
22
state.
As a general rule, if the plaintiff is a domiciliary of the forum,
the courts have sought to protect his interests,2 3 especially if doing so

interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict."
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 15, 237 N.E.2d 877, 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737
(1968). This rationale was recently followed in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Oakley v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 294 F.
Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "It appears that in New York the most significant
'contacts' to be evaluated are the relative interests of the states involved." 294 F.
Supp. at 507. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
6, comment fat 14 (1969).
21. See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734
(1968); In re Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811
(1967); cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (Court stated that
insurance companies should forsee that their insureds may move and that
insurance contracts are therefore normally enforceable in the state wherein the
insured has some significant contact with the forum state).
22. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248
N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969) (New York had superior interest in having
its public policy applied in a contract matter). "[W]here the foreign jurisdiction
has no interest in the application of its law, where there was no clear expression of
intent that foreign law governs and where we have the power to apply our own
law and give effect to the policy this State has adopted... we should apply our
own law." In re Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 137, 228 N.E.2d 799, 808, 281
N.Y.S.2d 811, 823 (1967) (action involving property rights); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1969). But see Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (court held
that even though the parties involved in this negligence action were domiciliaries
of New York, Colorado had a greater interest in the outcome of the litigation and
New York public policy would not bar application of Colorado law).
23. "As between two states, the law of that one which has the predominant,
if not the sole interest in the protection and regulation of the rights of the person
and persons involved should, of course, be invoked." In re Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478,
485-86, 236 N.E.2d 152, 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993, 998 (1968); cf. Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Court
held that a state is not bound by the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution to give effect to another state's law which is contrary to the public
policy of the forum); National Screen Service Corp. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 364 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1966). "There is a general tendency in a

majority of jurisdictions to choose the construction of insurance contracts most
favorable to the insured." 364 F.2d at 277.
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conforms to that state's public policy and no other jurisdiction has a
substantial countervailing interest in the outcome of the litigation.2 4
The court in the instant case initially acknowledged the well-settled
rule that a federal court sitting in a diversity action involving a conflict
of laws question must apply the choice of law rule of the forum
state.2" In resolving the conflicts question presented by this case, the
court first determined that under either the traditional conflicts
rules,26 the "grouping of contacts," 2 7 or the "greatest interest" tests,
Cuban law governed the outcome of this case. The court found that
there were more contacts with Cuba than with New York; 2 8 in
addition, cases relied upon by plaintiff for the "greatest interest" rule

were inapposite to the facts in the case at bar.29 The court agreed
with plaintiffs' argument that the domicile of the party seeking
recovery was crucial to the application of the greatest interest test but
determined that it seemed more logical to determine domicile at the
time of entering into the contract than at the time of bringing suit."
Furthermore, the court declared that in any event the case did not
involve a conflict of laws question since there was no problem

24. "[C] ourts must be on the alert against making exception to the local law
that would defeat a legitimate interest of the forum state without serving the
interest of any other state." Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEXAS L. REv. 657, 669 (1959). But see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209
N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
25. In accordance with the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
federal courts sitting in a diversity action must apply the choice of law rule of the
forum state. See Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1960);
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxton, 125 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 316 U.S.
685 (1942); Oakley v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
26. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
27. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
28. Thus sustaining the district court's finding that Cuban law had always
controlled these contracts. 312 F. Supp. at 1063.
29. Plaintiff had relied upon, inter alia, Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237
N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) (wrongful death action) and In re
Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967) (case
involving property rights). The court did not distinguish Intercontinental Planning
v. Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969), another
case cited by plaintiff which did involve a contract question and where the New
York court applied the "most significant interest" test. See notes 20-24 supra and
accompanying text.
30. The instant court upheld the district court's finding of fact that plaintiffs
and Turull were residents and domiciliaries of Cuba at the time the contracts were
made. 312 F. Supp. at 1063.
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concerning conflicting legal rules. It announced that the real question
was whether a New York court would give extraterritorial effect to
Cuban laws which manifestly governed the contracts or would refuse
to do so on the ground of New York public policy. The court
reasoned that even though the act of state doctrine3 ' was not
involved in this case, there was no policy or reason for a New York
court to refuse to give extraterritorial effect to Cuban law. Finally, the
court found that the equities involved favored the defendant since
other policy-holders in defendant's mutual company would be
affected adversely by payment from general assets, and since defendant
could not use the Cuban assets for its own benefit, there would be no
unjust enrichment by refusing payment in dollars. In a vigorous and
extensive dissent, Judge Feinberg concluded that since the policy
expressly provided for payment in United States dollars, it should be

enforced as the parties originally intended.3 2 Moreover, of the three
jurisdictions having any contact with these policies, Cuba had the least
interest in the outcome of the case. 3 Feinberg contended that New
York courts would not apply Cuban law and render worthless
plaintiffs' benefits since New York has an announced policy of
protecting the rights of insureds and beneficiaries. 34
The fundamental question before the court in the instant case was
which of two innocent parties should bear the loss occasioned by the
Cuban government. An application of traditional equity concepts and
values would have caused judgment to have been rendered for

31. See notes 15 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
32. Since it was explicitly stated in the contract that payment was to be made
in dollars and since both contracting parties intended dollars to be the medium of
payment, this language should be enforced. See note 5 supra. The place of
performance is unimportant, said Feinberg, because defendant typically made
place of payment in the capital city for the convenience of the parties. The place
of performance was not an essential part of the bargain; moreover, in many other
instances defendant had paid elsewhere. 447 F.2d at 186, 187.
33. Feinberg conceded that Cuba had the greatest number of contacts, but
emphasized that Cuba had no interest in the outcome of the case because
defendant's Cuban assets would not be removed if defendant had to pay, nor
would any Cuban currency control laws be affected by a decision for plaintiffs.
Canada had already refused to apply Cuban law to a similar case because it
recognized its obligation to see that companies domiciled in Canada discharge
their obligations. Imperial Life Assurance Co. v. Colmenares, [1967] 62 D.L.R.2d
138 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1967).
34. New York has the most significant interest in the protection of the
domiciled beneficiaries and would apply its law, there being no conflict with
Canadian law and no justification for applying Cuban law. 447 F.2d at 185.
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plaintiffs, even if the court had been correct in its resolution of the
conflicts question. The insureds had performed fully their obligations
under the contracts until further performance was made impossible by
the Castro regime.35 Whether they paid in pesos or dollars is not
significant since during the entire period of the insured's performance,
the value of the dollar and peso was substantially equivalent
Consequently, payment of the policies in dollars in the United States
would not be a windfall for plaintiffs, nor would payment in dollars
be a harsh result for defendant since its total assets were pledged to its
obligations. Defendant's voluntary investment in Cuban assets and the

subsequent de facto expropriation of these assets are unfortunate, but
there is no equitable reason or policy which demands that defendant's
loss pass to plaintiffs. 36 A more egregious error was committed by the
court when it refused to adopt the present New York choice of law
rule and declared that no conflicts question was presented by the
instant case. 3 ' This determination casts a cloud upon the validity of
the instant holding and subjects the decision to severe criticism on the
grounds of the Erie doctrine. 3 s The choice of law rule in New York is
based unequivocally upon the "greatest interest" principle and the
policy and rationale of this conflicts theory dictate its application to
the instant case. Cuba had absolutely no interest in having its law
affect the outcome of this case. A judgment for plaintiffs would not
have caused any Cuban assets to have been liquidated nor any pesos to
leave Cuba in violation of its laws. Moreover, it would not have been

35. See Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan, 207 So. 2d 33, affd on
rehearing, 207 So. 2d 39 (Fla. App.), aff'd, 211 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1968)
(Cuban refugee brought suit in equity after its dismissal at law. Chancellor found
no equitable reason why plaintiff should not recover on the insurance contract
after having performed his obligation).
36. One further consideration should be mentioned here. If the Governments
of Canada and Cuba were to reconcile their differences, it is not unlikely that
defendant will recover at least part of its money now bound up in Cuban
investments. Plaintiffs, however, would gain nothing if a settlement were reached
because their rights have been judicially vitiated.
37. It is unfortunate that the court failed to state with more precision why it
believed a conflict of laws question was not present in this case. Perhaps it
believed that the case presented a false or illusory conflict. In any event, the
court's disposal of the problem was inadequate and a classic example of circular
reasoning: "[W]e feel that this case does not present a conflict-of-laws question
because it does not involve a choice among conflicting legal rules." 447 F.2d at
180. For an excellent treatment of the complex "False Conflicts" concept see 24
VAND. L. REV. 615 (1971); Traynor, supra note 24.
38. See note 24 supra.
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illegal under Cuban law for defendant to pay in a place other than
that designated in the place of payment clause. Nonetheless, Cuban
law provided that payment under these contracts could be made only
in Cuba in pesos-a law which unquestionably conflicts with New
York law and policy favoring the insured in adhesion contract
disputes. Canada previously had rendered judgment against a Canadian
insurer in a case involving facts almost identical to those of the present
case. 3 9 Consequently, the New York court, had it found that Canada
had the greatest interest in this case, would have applied Canadian law.
and found for plaintiffs. On the other hand, the court could have
found that New York had the paramount interest in the outcome of
this case because of its strong public policy of protecting the rights of
its resident insureds and beneficiaries.4 0 The court felt that the

"greatest interest" rule would not obtain in this case since it found
that plaintiffs and the deceased insured were domiciliaries of Cuba
when the contract was made. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs and
the deceased were residents of Cuba for an extended period, but
physical presence in a place does not create a change of domicile.4 1
Domicile requires a present intent to make a fixed locality a
permanent home. 42 Here, the Cuban residency was a necessity of
their business enterprise. The parties had always intended to return to
the United States upon retirement and indeed maintained property in

39. Imperial Life Assurance Co. v. Colmenares [1967] 62 D.L.R.2d 138
(Can. Sup. Ct. 1967). As pointed out by the dissent, the Canadian Supreme Court
refused to apply Cuban law to facts "not fairly distinguishable" from the instant
case. 447 F.2d at 186.
40. See National Screen Service Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 364 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1966); Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d
861 (2d Cir. 1960); Oakley v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Clay v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 377 U.S. 179 (1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Reporter's notes § 192,
comment d at 608: "In international cases, the courts have frequently not applied
the local law [Cuban] of the insured's domicile if under that law the policy would
be forfeited." Accord, Varas v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 176, 203 A.2d
505 (1964), (court should apply the rule that protects the insured).
41. "Mere change of residence although continued for a long time does not
effect a change of domicile." In re Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950
(1908).
42. "An intention to make a place one's home for a limited time may not
effect a change of domicile when there is a present intent to return to the previous
home." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, comment
b at 70. See In re James' Will, 221 N.Y. 242, 116 N.E. 1010 (1917) (the intent to
establish domicile, especially in a foreign country, must be clearly established).
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New York for this purpose.4 3 In any event, the burden of proof is on
the party who asserts that a change of domicile has taken place, 44 and
it is not clear that defendant carried that burden. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the insureds were domiciled in Cuba, they had been
domiciled in New York for approximately ten years prior to bringing
this action. Seemingly, plaintiffs should now be permitted to have the
benefit of New York's policy of protecting the rights of the insureds
and beneficiaries. Following this court's rationale in subsequent
insurance cases would require a finding that the law to be adopted is
that of the state in which the insured was domiciled when the contract

was made. Such a harsh result cannot be reconciled with the policy of
New York's "greatest interest" conflicts of laws principle.4"
R. Lee Bennett

43. The court noted in the opinion that both insureds stated in their
application for insurance that Cuba was their residence and that they did not
intend to change domicile. This was construed by the court to be "clear and
convincing evidence" of their intent to be domiciled in Cuba. A layman's
statement on an adhesion contract that no change of domicile was intended is
certainly not worthy of the weight accorded it by the court. Moreover, such a
statement is capable of the reverse presumption. The insureds could well have
been saying that they had no intent to change their domicile from New York to
Cuba. It is admittedly a small point, but the court found it to be the determinant
for their finding of Cuban domicile.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19, comment c
at 18.
45. Nor can this result be reconciled with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 187, 188, 192. See, e.g., § 188, comment (1)
(b) at 571: "[P]rotection of the justified expectations of the parties is the basic
policy underlying the field of contracts .... [T] heir expectations should not be
disappointed by application of the local law rules of a state which would strike
down the contract or a provision thereof unless the value of protecting the parties

is substantially overweighed in the particular case by the interest of the state with
the invalidating rule in having the rule applied." See also Weintraub, The
Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws-A
Critique, 46 IOWA L. REv. 713 (1961).
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UNITED

CONVENTION-LOCATION OF AIRLINE TICKET
STATES INSUFFICIENT

CONTACT FOR

PUR-

POSES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover
damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered during a flight from
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, to Tokyo, Japan, on defendant's aircraft. The flight ticket was purchased by plaintiff in
Vancouver. Defendant carrier, a Canadian domiciliary, maintained a
ticketing and booking office in New York. Plaintiff alleged that the
district court had jurisdiction under article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention' and under 28 U.S.C. § § 1331(a) and 1332(a)(2)
(1970).2 Article 28(1) provides four contacts on which an injured party
may rely in order to maintain jurisdiction over a defendant carrier: (1)
the domicile of the carrier; (2) the carrier's principal place of business;
(3) the carrier's place of business through which the contract was
made; or (4) the place of destination.' Defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the
alternative, for improper venue, on the ground that none of the
conditions of article 28(1) were satisfied. Faced with the question
whether the limitations of article 28(1) applied in the international or
in the domestic sense, the district court held that the article relates
solely to domestic venue and that venue was properly established since
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,

T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. Under article
1(1), the Convention "shall apply to all international transportation of persons,

baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire .... " Both parties agreed that
the Convention governed this case, since Japan, Canada, and the United States are
all High Contracting Parties within article 1(2). Eventually, over 90 countries
became parties to the Convention.
2. Section 1331(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" (emphasis added).
Section 1332(a)(2) provides further that the controversy must be between
"citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof .... "
3. 49 Stat. 3000, 3020 (1935). Article 28(1) provides: "An action for
damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier
or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination."
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defendant carrier maintained a place of business within the juris-

diction of the court. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, held, reversed. Where a ticket for an international flight is purchased outside of the United States and no contacts
with the United States exist beyond the presence of a ticketing and
booking office of the carrier, the limitations of article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention prohibit international jurisdiction within the
United States. Smith v. CanadianPacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798
(2d Cir. 1971).
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish uniformity in international air transportation.4 Pursuant to this goal the
Convention adopted article 28(1), which enumerated four forums in
which suits could be brought for alleged Convention violations- -the
carrier's domicile, its principal place of business, its place of business
through which the contract was made, or its place of destination Three
controversial questions have arisen concerning the meaning and scope
of article 28(1): whether the delineation of contacts in article 28(1)
was meant to guarantee or to limit plaintiff's choice of forums;6
whether article 28(1) pertains to domestic or national jurisdiction; and
whether article 28(1) applies to venue or to subject matter jurisdiction.7 Regarding the first question, the prevailing view has been that
article 28(1) limits the possible places where the suit may commence.8
As to the second issue, the earlier cases generally held that even if
none of the places enumerated in article 28(1) were located within the
jurisdiction of the particular American court before which the action
had been brought, then the action must be dismissed. Thus, in Winsor

4. See, e.g., Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.C.N.J.

1957); D. GOEDHUIs, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW
CONVENTION (1937).
5. See generally Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention,
26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217 (1959).
6. Compare, e.g., Berner v. United Airlines, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 9, 147
N.E.2d 732, 157 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (App. Div. 1956) (guarantee) with Mertens v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965) (limit).
7. For a good analysis of this particular controversy (as well as an extensive
account of the history and impact of the Convention itself) see Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV.
497 (1967).
8. See McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 205, 217 (1963). The author construes the original text of the
article, which uses the phrase, devra 9tre porte'e, to mean that the action must
be brought within one of the four categories, i.e. that the four are exclusive.
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v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 the fact that the carrier was incorporated in
Delaware was not recognized as a sufficient ground under article 28(1)
for maintaining the action in a New York federal court. 1" More recent
cases have rejected this view, however, holding that article 28(1) is not

concerned with domestic jurisdictional subdivisions of the United
States. The action may be maintained in any American court," state
or federal, as long as one of the four places designated in article 28(1)
is located somewhere within the United States. 12 A split of opinion
exists whether article 28(1) applies to venue or to subject matter
jurisdiction. 13 In Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 14 the ticket for
an international flight was purchased in California for a Switzerland
-Sudanese Republic flight. Relying on the purchase of the ticket at a
site within the United States through an agency of the carrier, plus the
existence of a regular ticketing and booking office within the United

9. 153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
10. See also Martino v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1961 U.S. & Can. Av. 651
(N.D. Ill. 1961) (the Illinois federal district court dismissed the action in which the
carrier was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in
Missouri, when the contract was made in Washington, D.C., and where the
destination was New York).
11. Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800 n.3 (2d Cir.
1971).
12. See, e.g., Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683, 686
(N.D. Ill. 1964) (it seems doubtful that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention,
almost all of whom were from civil law countries and only a few of whom were
from countries which have a federal system similar to that in the United States,
would be concerned at all with the internal operations of the judicial system of
any particular nation); Pitman v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 223 F. Supp.
887, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (article 28(1) refers only to national boundaries and not
to places within the boundaries of countries); Spencer v. Northwest Orient
Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (since article 28(1) was
drafted in contemplation of adherence by many nations with widely divergent
systems of jurisprudence and court structure, it was not intended that the article
deal with questions of technical subject matter jurisdiction within the framework
of the federal system of the United States). See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 7, at 523.
13. Attempts to label article 28(1) illustrate this split of opinion. For
example, when reprinted as part of the documents of the 1955 Hague Conference
on Private Air Law, article 28(1) was labeled "Jurisdiction and procedure." The
French and British versions in the same documents are not labeled at all. The
original description of the article by the United States appeared in the margin at
49 Stat. 3020 as "Venue of action." However, the codification at 49 U.S.C. §
1502 (1970), contains no accompanying label. 452 F.2d at 800 n. 6.
14. 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
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States, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that venue was
properly laid under article 28(1). Nudo v. Socidte' Anonyme Belge
D'Exploitation15 represents the subject-matter jurisdiction interpretation of article 28(1). The plaintiff in Nudo purchased a ticket in
Munich for a flight from Brussels to Munich. The domicile of the
defendant carrier was in Belgium. The District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania rejected plaintiff's contention that the court
had subject matter jurisdiction, on the grounds that defendant's sole
contact was the maintenance of a ticket office in Philadelphia where it
did a substantial amount of business. Thus, although article 28(1)
appears to limit the possible forums available under the Warsaw
Convention, and although the "national" approach to jurisdiction has
become the prevailing judicial and academic view, the question
whether article 28(1) refers to venue or to subject matter jurisdiction
remains unanswered.
In the instant case, the court held that there are two levels of
judicial power that must be examined in actions arising under the
Warsaw Convention: jurisdiction in the international (or treaty) sense
under article 28(1); and jurisdiction in the domestic law sense (i.e. the
power of a particular United States court, under federal statutes and
practice, to hear a Warsaw Convention case). It is only after
jurisdiction in both senses is established that the question of venue is
reached. The court noted that there was no indication that the
drafters of the Convention were concerned with the American court
system's distinction between venue and jurisdiction. It therefore
followed that the four contacts specified in article 28(1) were meant
to be applied to the particular factual situation of the case before any
questions of domestic jurisdiction or venue were concerned. The court
concluded that defendant carrier's principal place of business was in
Canada and that the contract for flight was not made through the
carrier's ticketing agency located in the United States. 16 The court
distinguished Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc. " According to the
court, Eck was not meant to be applied to the present situation, where
all activities concerning the international flight occurred outside the
United States, and where the only contact with the United States was

15. 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
16. According to the instant court, Smith did not pursue his contention in the
lower court that suit be allowed on the basis that New York was the carrier's
"principal place of business" within article 28(1); instead, he relied upon his
assertion that the carrier maintained in New York "a place of business through
which the contract has been made." 452 F.2d at 802.
17. 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
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the presence of a ticketing and booking office. 11 Since none of the
elements of article 28(1) were established, there was no basis for
international jurisdiction at the first level. Therefore, the necessity of
resolving the second level domestic law questions of jurisdiction and
venue was obviated, and plaintiff's suit was dismissed for lack of
international jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention.
In this case the court developed a logical test to use in determining
whether to grant or deny jurisdiction under article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, but the court's strict adherence to procedure
overlooked the substantive basis of the Convention itself. The court's
test, containing analysis at two distinct levels, relegates the venuejurisdiction issue to the domestic level, thereby rendering the
establishment of jurisdiction in the international sense of threshold
importance. It is possible that future courts, whether American or
foreign, may utilize the court's guideline in achieving a more uniform
application of the jurisdictional provisions of article 28(1). Such
procedural uniformity would achieve the desired result of a degree of
certainty that would be beneficial to both the claimant and the
carrier. It is also possible, however, that courts, in following this
court's analysis, will render the test useless by distinguishing future
cases on the facts. In other words, the court's strict interpretation of
the limitations of article 28(1) narrows the applicability of its test.
Furthermore, the instant court has done little to justify its denial of
access to United States courts in light of the rapidly changing state of
international air travel. At the time of the conception of the Warsaw
Convention, the four contacts of article 28(1) were thought to provide
benefits to passengers that would be unavailable without the Convention. Yet, because it is now often difficult to establish the principal
place of business or the domicile of the carrier, the Convention actually
precludes jurisdiction where it otherwise could have been found. 19
Therefore, the four contacts provided in article 28(1) should receive
different treatment in the future if passengers on international flights
are to receive the benefits intended by the drafters of the Convention.
If the wording of article 28(1) remains unchanged, it would seem

18. The court noted that nothing was shown to prove that there had been any
ticketing arrangements whatsoever between Vancouver and the United States
office. 452 F.2d at 803.
19. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 576. For example, in the
instant case plaintiff could have maintained jurisdiction over Canadian Pacific in
New York (or in any other place within the United States where the airline
operates an office) under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970) (diversity jurisdiction),
or under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970) (general venue provisions for federal courts).
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reasonable, in light of the increased number of major airline
establishments, to construe "the principal place of business" to mean
"an important" place of business. 1o An airline holding itself out as a
corporation serving individuals in countries where it maintains a
business establishment should be amenable to suit there. Since the
passenger's domicile is the one forum with which he or his attorney
probably is best acquainted, where his estate usually will be probated,
and where he will recover appropriate damages for himself or 'his
survivors, 2' a more comprehensive solution to the present problem
would be to amend article 28(1) to allow the plaintiff's domicile as
the primary jurisdictional contact. If, and only if, the passenger's
domicile cannot be determined (for instance, if the passenger is a
transient), then jurisdiction should be allowed: (1) at the domicile of
the carrier; (2) where the carrier maintains an important place of
business;
or (3) at the place of destination. The suggested
amendment, which would place primary emphasis on the passenger's
domicile, would not only allow the claimant to recover damages more
appropriate to those he would ordinarily receive in his own country,
but also would provide a predictable jurisdictional standard on which
both passenger and carrier may rely. In summary, it is clear that the
intended uniformity of application of rules under the Warsaw
Convention has not been accomplished by strict adherence to the
present provisions of article 28(1). A more liberal interpretation by

future courts, or amendment of article 28(1) itself, coupled with the
two level analysis suggested by the instant court would serve to
establish certainty in the rules pertaining to jurisdiction in suits arising
from international air travel.
David W. Pollard

20. See Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9
McGILL L.J. 352, 356 (1963). But see Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360
F.2d 804, 809 n.9 (2d Cir. 1966).
21. See Allan I. Mendelsohn's speech in Symposium on the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 519, 628 (1967). One of the greatest criticisms
of the Warsaw Convention concerns the limited liability of carriers (originally,
recovery was limited to approximately $8,300, but the Convention was amended
at the 1955 Hague Conference on Private Air Law to allow recovery of twice that
amount). Mr. Mendelsohn believes that by establishing jurisdiction according to
the domicile of the passenger such controversy may be resolved.
22. It is suggested that this second provision would encompass the second and
third provisions of the present article 28(1), thus providing a contact more
suitable to the present state of international air transportation.
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